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Domestic Partnership: Recognition and
Responsibility

RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN

A domestic partnershipis a business orpoliticalrecognitionof
two adults seeking to share benefits normally conferred upon
married couples. To date, partnerships have conferred benefits
only; the most logicalprogression is for partnerships to include
responsibilities of support, commitment and obligation within the
economic partnershipconstruct of emergingfamily law. When this
occurs, heterosexual couples may lack incentive, but homosexual
couples will achieve surer due process recognition regardless of
same-sex marriagelitigation.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUES

First and foremost, domestic partnership is an index of belonging. It
is a response to what Erich Fromm identifies as the deepest human need,
"the need to overcome.. .separateness, to leave the prison
of.. .aloneness."' Examined within this context, isolated from the
hyperbole of family values, morality, and economic costs, domestic
partnership is little more than a modicum of public recognition given to
a private contract between two consenting adults.2 It is a civil partnership supported by private or public policy, or both.
Yet, standing at that index of belonging, domestic partnership ripples
through "[s]hared beliefs, social and cultural metanarratives shaped in

accordance with dominant ideology."3 It is because of what it conjures,
not because of what it does, that feverish opposition is raised: "The

perceived increase in nontraditional intimate entities has generated both

celebration and concern." 4 But this concern is not without benefit to all
sides affected by domestic partnerships. Those parties who sense in

domestic partnership an attack upon traditional notions of family,

1. ERICH FROMM, THE ART OF LOVING 9 (1956).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hicks, 4 Legal Threshold is Crossed by Gay Couples in
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al.
Some came as if headed to a formal event, dressed in tuxedos or party dresses.
Many had to go to work and wore business suits or casual slacks. All of
them-the first 109 couples to register as "domestic partners" in the City of
New York-left with something long withheld, an official acknowledgement
of their untraditional lives.
Id.
3. Martha A. Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in
4merican Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 337-38 (footnote omitted).
4. Id. at 393; see also Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, 4 More
Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic PartnershipOrdinances, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1186 (1992); Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of
Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of
"Family",29 J. FAM. L. 497 (1991); Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage:
A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 539 (1991).
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religion, and community values' should recognize an opportunity for
strengthening through dialogue over the core notion of family. Those
who celebrate the availability of domestic partnership should recognize,
in the struggle for acceptance, the core values which contribute to the
functioning, belonging intimate entity. It is the premise of this Article
that the advent of domestic partnership is not a win/lose situation for
either side of the debate, but rather a win/win situation in which both
sides benefits through dialogue. 6
A.

Defining Domestic Partnership

What then is domestic partnership?

In its simplicity,

domestic

partnership is one step more than cohabitation, but one step less than
marriage. Its essential ingredient is a business or government recognition of benefits conferred on a non-marital adult couple of the same or
opposite sex because of conformity with a procedure established by the
business or government.7 Increasingly, both businesses and govern-

5. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY
LAW (1989); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE INWESTERN LAW (1987);
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CI. L. REV. 115
(1992); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L.
REV. 146 (1986); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Constitution's Protection of Individual
Rights: The Real Role of the Religion Clauses, 49 U. PITr. L. REV. 717 (1988); John
T. Noonan, Jr., Principledor PragmaticFoundationsfor the Freedom of Conscience?,
5 J.L. & RELIGION 203 (1987); Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family
Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1; Bruce C. Hafen, The Family
as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1989); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional
Status of Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancingthe Individualand Social
Interests, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 463 (1983).
6. Professor Carl Schneider writes that law has become a means by which people
avoid moral discourse; this does not contribute to the common good. Instead, he
advocates moral discourse as a necessary and effective means to address waning
religiosity. See Carl E. Schneider, MoralDiscourseand the TransformationofAmerican
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
DecisionmakingAbout Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9 (1990).
7. The judiciary could interpret a state statute so as to confer benefits upon a nonmarital couple as well. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1989) (interpreting New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations to allow for the
survivor of two men who had shared an apartment for more than 10 years, to benefit
from rent control as the surviving member of a "family"). For a recent extension of this
familial development, see Dunphy v. Gregory, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994), which held that
unmarried cohabitants who exhibit intimate familial relationship that is stable, enduring,
substantial, and mutually supportive, and who witness wrongful death or serious physical
injury to the other cohabitant, may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

ments have provided the mechanism through which, by contract, a
period of time together, or registration, specified benefits may be

conferred upon a partner even though sexual contact is an ele-

ment-although not a material one-of the arrangement.'

At present,

benefits could include health care, hospital visitation, housing, or other
specific benefits able to be conferred by the business or government.)

These newly established domestic partnerships are, particularly for the
homosexual couple, a means by which one partner may be able to

remain at home and still receive benefits because of the employment of
the other partner. They have become a means by which equality of

benefits extends to couples regardless of sexual orientation."

An

examination of the definition and scope of domestic partnership will be
the focus of Part II of this Article.
Because domestic partnerships involve persons living together in

relationships that most often involve sexual activity, they should be
examined within the context of judicial, legal, and public acceptance of

arrangements involving sexual activity. Contrary to public opinion, the
seminal privacy decision of Griswold v. Connecticut" in 1965 did not
eliminate the judicial restriction upon what was then called meretricious
relationships. The right to privacy in Griswold was confined to married

cohabitants and thus only persons of the opposite sex acting as a unit
were sanctioned by the state. By 1972 however, "Griswold's right of

8. For a recent survey of business and government requirements to establish a

domestic partnership, see M.V. Lee Badgett, Equal Payfor Equal Families, ACADEME,
May-June 1994, at 26, 29. They include: (1) minimum time requirements either before
a partner is eligible or before a partnership is dissolved; (2) evidence of financial
interdependence; (3) sharing a joint residence; (4) boundaries for the relationship,
including exclusivity, no close blood relationship, and no current legal partner; (5)
naming the partner as a beneficiary of life insurance or pension plan. Id.
9. See, e.g., Not Enoughfor Domestic Partners, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1993, at
A20 (editorial). Former New York City Mayor David Dinkins' executive order providing
for domestic partnership in New York City allowed for homosexual and heterosexual
adults to register as partners and qualify for city apartments in the same manner as
married couples, have the same visiting rights at city jails and hospitals, and those who
work for the city may take unpaid leave to care for newborn children,
10. A staff oncologist at Montefiore Medical Center sued the hospital because she
was receiving only half of the benefits of her heterosexual peer. That is, because the
heterosexual employee was married, her or his spouse would be entitled to benefits from
his or her employer. Nonetheless, because the homosexual employee was unable to
marry because of laws prohibiting him or her, the same benefits were unavailable to his
or her partner even though both heterosexual and homosexual persons worked the same
number of hours. See James Barron, Bronx Hospital Gives Gay Couples Spouse
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at Al; see also Badgett, supra note 8, at 26.
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the state may not interfere in the marital
privacy enjoyed by two adults). For an analysis as to how this privacy right should
apply to unmarried homosexual persons, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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privacy, ostensibly based upon the nobility of marriage as a social
institution, was converted by Eisenstadt v. Baird2 into the right of the
individual, married or unmarried, to be free of unwarranted governmental
intrusion into his [or her] sexual conduct."1 3 This privacy right of the
adult individual to be free from governmental regulation in sexual
matters shortly resulted in the California case of Marvin v. Marvin.4
When the woman plaintiff in Marvin brought suit against her
cohabitant, she alleged that she had given up her career as an entertainer

to devote full time to being a "companion, homemaker, housekeeper and
cook" for the defendant, and for this he promised to provide her with
support for the remainder of her life. 5 There was no written record of
the contract, and the male defendant denied all the material elements and
alleged that any such arrangement was contrary to public policy since
sexual activity was implied in the arrangement. His argument being that
the state should not enforce a contract when immoral-and
perhaps
6
illegal-sexual activity was a part of the arrangement.'
The California Supreme Court recognized that many more persons
were living together in non-marital cohabitation and thus any claim
based upon such an arrangement should not be barred by public policy
as long as the contract did not explicitly provide for sexual services. 7
It is significant that the California court took notice of the changing
definition of relationships in its jurisdiction to arrive at its decision.'
Thus, after Marvin, non-married persons were able to contract between

12.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).

13.

HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES § 2.1, at 27 (2d ed. 1988). For a discussion of the impact of Griswold and
Eisenstadt,see Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition:From Griswold to Eisenstadt
and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994).
14. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). The plaintiff

eventually lost her appeal, but not without establishing the rights of non-marital parties
to contract together even though sexual relations were a part of the bargain. See Marvin
v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
15. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
16. Id. at 668, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
17. Id. at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
18. In 1993, the Supreme Court of Hawaii allowed an equal protection challenge
to its opposite sex requirement for statutory marriage, in part, because of its recognition
that conditions had changed in society. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993)
(explaining that "customs change with an evolving social order"). But see Herbert W.
Titus, Defining Marriageand the Family,3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 327 (1994)
(arguing that the focus should not be on social change, but upon a moral order imposed
by God or nature).

themselves in a like manner to antenuptial agreements between married

persons, even though these non-marital contracts did not have to be in
writing,' 9 and they were effective immediately, not upon marriage. The
contractual element in the Marvin situations, and antenuptial agreements

for prospectively married persons, is important because it signals a shift
in focus from the status of the arrangement to the partnership of the
parties."
Because of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Marvin, the next stage was
possible: domestic partnerships. 2
Domestic partnerships provided

benefits that previously had been reserved to marriage.' The partnership was expanded beyond consideration of what the parties could do

for each other, to what the business or state would do for each of the
parties expressly because of the partnership. Furthermore, it allowed for
these marriage-like benefits to be conferred on opposite-sex partners, as

well as same-sex partners; this ratified the private nature of the
partnership and the choice of the participants. This uniquely private

element would not be permitted within marriage, a status arrangement
where the state is the historical third-party participant. This is a
significant development and must be viewed within the progression
through Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Marvin; it affirms the expanding
nature of partnership in relationships.

19. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act is law in several states and provides
that all premarital agreements must be in writing. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1611
(West 1994).
20. It is important to note that neither legislators nor courts initiated the changes
that brought the focus from status to partnership. The following assessment is
illustrative: "Law cannot lead where other constitutive discourses and philosophies will
not follow. Other disciplines such as economics, psychology, sociology, public policy,
anthropology, biology, and history, all have their own narratives about the family with
certain values and assumptions embedded in them." Fineman, supra note 3, at 398. Or
to put it more simply: "Since the courts read the newspapers and have always been
sensitive to political movements, their decisions reflect the same conflicts and
ambivalence concerning marriage which are prevalent in our society. This is particularly

true of the United States Supreme Court." CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 2.1, at 27.
21. Some would argue that because of these cases and others, the courts allowed
for the deterioration of marriage. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Marriageand the State:
The WitheringAway ofMarriage,62 VA. L. REV. 663 (1976); John T. Noonan, Jr., The
Family and The Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 255 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii Supreme
Court remanded the case to determine state's prohibition of same-sex marriage. The
court stated: "Marriage is a state-conferred legal partnership status, the existence of
which gives rise to a multiplicity of rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that
particular relation." Id. at 58. For a recitation of those benefits, see id. at 59.
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B. Marriage and Domestic Partnership
The true significance of domestic partnership lies in its similarity to
marriage. Because it is similar, it offers an alternative. What would
occur if adults in the United States decided to abandon the state-involved
status of marriage for a partnership containing all of the ingredients of
marriage, including obligations, benefits, and termination? 3
To answer, it is necessary to examine the status concept of marriage
in its historical sense. Based on the acknowledged expertise of Professor
Homer H. Clark, Jr., the essential ingredients of marriage are:
(1) A ceremony, with a
(2) minister or delegate of the state,
(3) consummation by the parties who are
(4) capable of consenting without fraud or duress,
(5) to a permanent, monogamous relationship between a
(6) man and a woman who inhabit a joint domicile, and the

(7) incidents of the relationship 24are the province of the law and not
within the control of the parties.
While informal marriage, common law unions, are still allowed, the
method by which the status of marriage has been conferred has remained
similar in the Western world for hundreds of years. The purpose of the
method was to ensure an economic producing unit of society with
responsibilities for child rearing; today that purpose includes opportunities for mutual affection, companionship, and sexual satisfaction.25
Even though domestic partnership and other alternatives to traditional
marriage have gained attention and have flourished,26 all alternatives

23. Inequality between contracting parties would both jeopardize the partnership
and invite state participation in a renewed status arrangement. Throughout the Middle
Ages, the emerging Christian Church regularized marriage into the status arrangement
that exists today in an attempt to protect a party to the marriage, spouse or child, who
was unable to participate equally in the partnership. See generally DAVID HERLIHY,
MEDIEVAL HOUSEHOLDS (1985).
24. See CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 2.1, at 21-25.
25. Id. at 25. For a discussion of the initial changes and challenges to the
definition of marriage, see Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation ofMarriage:Tradition
and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (1974); Mary Ann Glendon, Power and Authority
in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections of Changing Ideologies, 23 AM. J.

Cow. L. 1 (1975).

26. A number of other case developments "may be regarded as diminishing the
significance of marriage as a social institution." CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 2.1, at 29.

acknowledge marriage as the "core affiliation."27 "Legal recognition
of these alternatives is justified by reference to their similarity to

heterosexual marriage in regard to the emotional and economic functions
assumed in the creation of a sexual tie."

Thus, marriage as a status

has not been rejected, nor is it in danger of being abolished, but in that
it is challenged by an alternative, its authority as well as its centrality is
being debated. This debate is good.
For some adults, however, the marriage status cannot be abandoned

because it was never an option. Thus, persons related by consanguinity
or affinity would be prohibited from marriage because of prohibitions

against incest. Gay and lesbian persons would not find marriage an
available option because the status of marriage does not presently

provide for their sexual orientation.29 Perhaps because of the efforts of

this latter group-homosexuals--the alternative to marriage as found in
domestic partnership has developed more rapidly than expected. But
even if this is true, some gay and lesbian persons would even reject the

status of marriage as "an inherently problematic institution that betrays

the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism."3

See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); New Jersey

Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (both cases holding that marriage
has no effect on entitlement to state benefits).

27. Fineman, supra note 3, at 394; see also David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian
Families:JudicialAssumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 345

(1994).
28. Fineman, supranote 3, at 394. For recent examples of this use of analogy, see
William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriageandthe Right ofPrivacy, 103 YALE
L.J. 1495 (1994); David P. Russman, Note, Alternative Families: In Whose Best
Interests?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31 (1993); James Trosino, American Wedding:
Same-Sex Marriageandthe MiscegenationAnalogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1993); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993).
29. The use of the word orientation is deliberate; it represents a conclusion that
homosexuality is not a choice, but rather an orientation brought about through genetics
or hormones.
See Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and
Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identify, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836-43 (1993);
Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and
Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (1993); Simon LeVay, A Difference in
Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE
1034 (1991); RICHARD C. FRIEDMAN, MALE HoMOsExuALITY: A CONTEMPORARY
PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE (1988); Richard Green, The Immutability of (Homo)sexual Orientation: Behavioral Science Implications for a Constitutional (Legal)
Analysis, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 537 (1988); SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE
THEORY OF SEXUALITY (James Strachey trans., 1962) (1905); C.W. Socarides, A
ProvisionalTheory ofMale Homosexuality, 49 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 27 (1968). Sexual
orientation immutability was an issue in the recent same-sex Hawaiian decision. See
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 53 (Haw. 1993).
30. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage", 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993). For analysis of the opinion that same-
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But obtaining the right to marry can be viewed as a liberating victory.
Gay and lesbian organizations such as Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund advocate and support test case litigation and education
about "virtually every area of concern -to lesbians and gay men,
including discrimination in employment, housing, and the military;
AIDS and HI-V-related policy and healthcare; parenting and relationship
issues; domestic partner benefits; immigration; and constitutional
rights., 31 Denied the option of marriage, the homosexual community
has made domestic partnership a civil rights issue, accelerating its
adoption by both business and government entities. Indeed, if responsibility, in addition to the current benefits, becomes an ingredient of
domestic partnership, the due process recognition of gay and lesbian

relationships will be significantly advanced. This Article will explore
the due process and equal protection impacts domestic partnership will
have upon the gay and lesbian community, homosexual marriage, and
the future development of domestic partnerships.
C. Morality, Religion, and Domestic Partnership
At a minimum, domestic partnership has brought attention to the
changes in family law. "Family law has moved from a patriarchal
structure to a model of formal gender equality with an emphasis on
rights of individuals within the family."32 This new definition differs
in significant degree from the constitutional decisions affecting equality,
privacy, and the nature of individual rights. Objections to this definition
assert that it represents nothing more than "a celebration of 'self' as the

sex marriage is harmful to the gay and lesbian community, see Eskridge, Jr., supra note

28, at 1486-93.
31. LambdaLegal Defense and EducationFundStatement ofPurpose, 10 LAMBDA
UPDATE 1, 2 (1993).
32. Linda J. Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message: The Misuse
of Cultural Feminist Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L.

REv. 1, 2 (1993). Such an idea is not without its critics. Id. at 23-25. But it would be
difficult to deny, at least from an examination of the current jurisprudence, that the
definition is correct. See also Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law:
The Dilemma of the GenderedNature ofLegal Reasoning,64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.886
(1989); Frances Olsen, From FalsePaternalismto False Equality: JudicialAssaults on
Feminist Community, Illinois, 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1518 (1986); MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); Martha Minow,
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987).

ultimate concern, the final arbiter, the trump to all moral claim."33
Pointing to such studies as Beyond Rhetoric,34 a detailed study of the
plight of children in America who have been abused, neglected, and
abandoned by parents, critics of the new definition of family place the

blame upon parents' celebration of self.
Another criticism of the new definition of family is that there is an

absence of moral discourse.35 What is missing in the new definition of
family is a moral discourse about such issues as non-marital cohabitation, adultery, homosexuality, sexual relations, and reproduction.36
' whose search
Instead, the law has provided for a "psychologic man"37

for self-fulfillment comes before everything else, and who instead of
seeking what is good, seeks only what works.38
It is difficult to accurately identify what is moral; the task is easier if
there is an explicit reference to an objective religion. Of course another

criticism of the new family is that it does not accommodate religious
values.39 Perhaps the most famous exponent of the view that religion
in America should be taken more seriously is Stephen L. Carter. He

writes in The Culture ofDisbeliefthat: "The legal culture that guards the
public square still seems most comfortable thinking of religion as a
hobby, something done in privacy, something that mature, public-spirited

33. Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politicsof Virtue: Animals, Theology
and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REv. 923, 1121 (1991).
34. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (1991).
35. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 6. Professor Schneider has been characterized
by one author as "defender of the [o]rder." Lacey, supra note 32, at 29. "Schneider's
overall theme that moral dialogue has disappeared from family law implicitly suggests
that those who advocate changes in the area are immoral or at best amoral." Id.
36. See generally Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis and the Channelling
Function in Family Law, 55 ALB. L. REV. 669 (1992).
37. Schneider, supra note 6, at 1845.
38. Id. at 1848. For a critique of Professor Schneider's argument, see Steve
Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or
Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard,32 UCLA L. REV. 852 (1985). Susoeff
argues that judges do take what is defined as immoral behavior into consideration when
making custody determinations. See also Paul Finkelman, Family, Crime, and Government Interests: Commentary on Schneider and Stith, 55 ALB. L. REV. 689 (1992);
Carrie G. Costello, Legitimate Bonds and Unnatural Unions: Race, Sexual Orientation,
and Control of the American Family, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 79 (1992); Martha
Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 925.
39. On the occasion of the United Nations 1994 International Year of the Family,
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops published a pastoral message from the
United States Catholic Bishops to families. See FOLLOWING THE WAY OF LOVE (1993);
see also U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, PUrriNG CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FIRST (1992);
POPE JOHN PAUL I, LETTER TO FAMILIES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF THE
FAMILY (1994).
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adults do not use as the basis for politics." ' In his call for religious
respect, he implies religious accommodation and gives as successful
examples of accommodation the civil rights struggle,"1 capital punishment, 2 abortion and euthanasia, 3 and teaching values.4 Note that
he is not advocating an end to discourse, nor to any more certitude than
those advocating elimination of religious considerations. Yet what he
does advocate is that:
[R]eligions, for all their arrogance and sinfulness, can often provide approaches
to the consideration of ultimate questions that a world yet steeped in materialistic ideologies desperately requires.... [I]t is vital that the religions struggle to
maintain the tension between the meanings and understanding propounded by
the state and the very different set of meanings and understandings that the
contemplation of the ultimate frequently suggests. 45

There is a tension between morality and religion versus domestic
partnership. This tension is due in part to the belief on both sides that
domestic partnership is an element that will tip the balance of power

from one side to the other. One side views it as at least the secular

sanctification of meretricious sexual activity and, at most, surely the next
step before the legalization of homosexual marriages. The other side
views it as economic and political recognition of either choice, or the

due process recognition of sexual orientation that will precipitate
additional gains in individual liberty. Again, it is the premise of this

Article that domestic partnership is, most simply, an issue about
belonging; it is not a win/lose battle. Rather, through dialogue, it is a
win/win issue.46 Advocates of natural law or religious conviction have
something to contribute; advocates of change have the same.

Professor Carter, in his argument for accommodating religion, provides
a helpful comment to those advocating moral and religious positions.
He writes:

40.

STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 54 (1993).

41. Id. at 227-29.
42. Id. at 258-62.
43. Id. at 232-58.
44. Id. at 200-06.
45. Id. at 273.
46. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics In
Transforming Moral Convictions Into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501 (1989) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)); Noonan, Jr., supra note 5;
McConnell, supra note 5.

If, as most Americans believe, there is a God external to the human mind, and
if that God has tried to communicate with us, whether through revelation or
some other path, then the human task is surely to discover the contents of that
communication, not to surrender that possibility in return for the freedom to call
one's own politics God's will.47

Even if some believe that God's will is quite clear on any point,48
surely the value of revelation from God's will could benefit from

explanation and dialogue. We can all take solace in the acknowledgement by the Supreme Court of Hawaii that: "[W]e do not believe that
trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will. ' 49'

For those that advocate that there are many forms of morality that do
not derive from religion,5" dialogue provides ascertainment of those
many forms. Surely, among those many forms of morality must be a
sensitivity for those persons and institutions still unable to comprehend

the "major changes in family law, and law and religion, brought about
by the dominance of liberal thought."'" This sensitivity is of even

greater value if it can be extended to those who never extended it
before.52 If the persistent objection of those seeking the freedom to
explore alternatives not encompassed within a traditional Judeo-Christian

model is the fundamental right to choose, then this right to choose
should extend to those maintaining religious values as well. Both sides
must concentrate on a win/win milieu.

47. CARTER, supra note 40, at 73.
48. See generally Titus, supra note 18; Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose,
Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1 (1991); David M. Smolin,
Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to
ProfessorPerry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE
AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991));
David M. Smolin, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and Self-Censorship in Legal
Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345 (1988).
49. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993).
50. See generally Lacey, supra note 32, at 29 (describing the many perspectives
within family law jurisprudence, those derived from religion and those derived from
secularity).
51. Id.at2.
52. For examples of authors expressing the need for dialogue and sensitivity, see
RUTH COLKER, ABORTION & DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW
(1992); Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion,
and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989); Judith Areen, A NeedForCaring,86 MCH.
L. REv. 1067 (1988); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV.

1574 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
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D.

Where Lies The Future?

The future of domestic partnerships is expansive. In both business and

political enterprises, partnership is nurtured by the ideology of individual
freedom, sustained by the economic necessity of recruiting and retaining

good employees and citizens, and warranted by legal doctrines of equal
protection, 53 privacy,54 due process, 55 freedom of speech, 6 and freedom from discrimination based on sexual orientation.57 In addition, the
partnership initiatives are sparked by local initiatives, something the
current federal judiciary favors over judicial activism.
They are

53. See, e.g., Stephen Zamansky, Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and
Homosexuals' Right to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221 (1993)
(arguing for equal protection of the law for homosexuals).
54. See generally Hohengarten, supra note 28 (arguing for a holistic approach to
the law governing marriage, thereby imposing a duty on the state to justify its exclusion
of gay and lesbian persons from a specific relationship); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real
Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, andLegal Protection
for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992) (arguing that same-sex
couples will never achieve true equality until they are free to discuss their private
relationships in the same manner as heterosexual couples); David Link, Comment, The
Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments of Same-Sex
Couples, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1055 (1990).
55. Generally, due process constitutional claims are best utilized by majority
populations and practices, and equal protection by minorities. Nonetheless, at least one
author advocates that litigation involving homosexuals should "combine substantive due

process claims that focus on conduct with equal protection claims that focus on status."

Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1619 (1993) (due process would emphasize the right to engage in loving
conduct, including sexual conduct); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand
the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal
Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988).
56. At least three cases involving the military and discharge of homosexuals
resulted from speech, that is, acknowledgement that the military person was homosexual.
See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993);
Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990); BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp.
1372 (E.D. Wis.) (1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990). See generally Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1695 (1993) (arguing that the First Amendment provides the most reliable path to
success of any of the doctrinal claims made by lesbian and gay rights lawyers).
57. See, e.g., Mary A. Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A
Comment on the Legal History ofLitigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV.
1643 (1993); Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation Discriminationin the Wake of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REv. 773 (1988).
58. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (state has the
ability to enact regulations to protect its citizens); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv.,

domestic matters, traditionally an area from which the federal judiciary

will abstain from exercising jurisdiction unless confronted with egregious
harm.59 It is safe to assume that domestic partnership will continue to
expand.

This Article shall examine three possibilities for expansion in domestic
partnerships: First, because it offers a sense of public belonging to the
lesbian and gay community, the unique opportunity of partnership shall

be examined. In particular, to this point, the partnership arrangement
has centered on benefits--health, visitation, and real estate. But what of

responsibilities? For a partnership to offer a viable sense of family, it
will need to expand to either a statutory or an implied theory of
responsibility, and thus it will envision support obligations as well.
Second, once obligations become involved, domestic partnership

becomes even more similar to marriage. Will the ability to marry
follow? This issue has particular consequences for the lesbian and gay
community, especially in light of the precarious legal future of marriage

litigation.6" Finally, even without the possibility of marriage, what are
the likely areas into which domestic partnership may expand benefits?
One is testamentary transfer, especially since the National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Law revised the Uniform Probate Code
in 1990 to include multiple references to the changing American
family.6 The ability of a domestic partner to inherit from an intestate
partner, elect against a partner's last will and testament, and benefit from
exempt property and allowances, may be statutory changes of the future.

This Article shall discuss the various issues, indentified in Part I, that

surround the domestic partnership device. Part II shall define the current
structure of domestic partnership benefits, including both business and
government models. Part III shall examine current cases affecting the

492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) ("But the goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to
remove inexorably 'politically divisive' issues from the ambit of the legislative process,
whereby the people through their elected representatives deal with matters of concern
to them.").
59. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (federal courts continue
to abstain from interference in state domestic relations matters).
60. See generally Trosino, supra note 28; Jennifer L. Heeb, Comment,
Homosexual Marriage,the Changing American Family, and the HeterosexualRight to
Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. Rv. 347 (1993); Otis R. Damslet, Note, Same-Sex
Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 555 (1993); Edward J. Juel, Note, Non-

traditionalFamily Values: Providing Quasi-maritalRights to Same-Sex Couples, 13
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 317 (1993). Much of the doubts center on the judicial action

surrounding Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the state's
prohibition of same-sex marriage is subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii
Constitution and remanding for consideration of any compelling state interest that might
justify classification).
61. See infra notes 273-87 and accompanying text.
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establishment of domestic partnerships, as well as the public policy

arguments used against them. Part IV shall discuss the specific role that
domestic partnerships have had in the gay and lesbian community. Part
V discusses the next stage beyond benefits: responsibilities, and gives
specific examples of how domestic partners could acquire benefits and
responsibilities through expansion of contractual and statutory elements.
II.

DEFINING DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS

A.

The Business Community

Business was first. In the introduction to his book, The 100 Best
Companies for Gay Men and Lesbians, Ed Mickens writes that:
"Employers who do well addressing gay and lesbian issues are the
organizations that will excel in the years to come."'62 The assessment
is based on economics. This is not just because of the economic power
of the homosexual community or the ability of organizations to attract
and retain employees, but because "organizations that address gay and
lesbian issues demonstrate a willingness to listen and respond to the
concerns of all their employees." 63 The economics of domestic
partnership is crucial, be the employees heterosexual or homosexual, and
the simplicity of that approach tempts the observer to convert to the
legal world of law and economics. 6 Thus, despite the concerns of
morality, discrimination, similarity to marriage, and imprecision of

62.

ED MICKENS, THE 100 BEST COMPANIES FOR GAY MEN AND LESBIANS 1

(1994). Other helpful publications are: DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP ORGANIZING MANUAL
($10.00), available from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Publications Dept.,
1734 14th Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20009-4309; RECOGNIZING LESBIAN AND GAY
FAMILIEs: STRATEGIES FOR OBTAINING DOMESTIC PARTNERS BENEFITS (1992) ($15.00),

available from National Center for Lesbian Rights, 1663 Mission Street, 5th Floor, San
Francisco, Ca. 94103; NEGOTIATING FOR EQUAL BENEFITS ($15.00), available from the

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 666 Broadway, New York, New

York 10012-9849.
63. MICKENS, supra note 62, at 2. But see Barbara P. Noble, Attitudes Clash on

Jobs andAIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, § 3, at 25. (Reporting that the National Gay

and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute got only 98 completed surveys from the Fortune
1,000 companies including a study; there were 145 outright refusals, and of the
companies responding, only five offered domestic partnership benefits.)
64. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Issues ofReligious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1989) (advocating that
difficult issues can be resolved if simply reduced to economic considerations).

definition, business "just went and did it" because employees convinced
themselves,
their peers, and management that it was good for busi65
ness.
Initially, it is important to note that when providing domestic

partnership benefits, some businesses and localities do not provide them

for both heterosexual and homosexual partners; some exclude heterosexual partners. The rationale for exclusion of heterosexuals being that they
have the option of marriage. Because marriage and domestic partnership
are different in both obligations and benefits, the possibility exists for an
equal protection challenge. One author has noted that "[f]rom the
liberation perspective, requiring marriage for benefit eligibility discriminates against all unmarried couples, whether homosexual or heterosexual"' and has concluded that "[u]ntil unmarried heterosexual partners
are routinely included, the recognition of domestic partners will not
constitute a radical redefinition of family."67
And so it was that in 1991 Montefiore Medical Center in Bronx, New
York, became the "largest private employer in the nation to provide the
same health benefits for homosexual workers and their partners as for
heterosexual employees and their husbands or wives."68 The hospital
required that gay and lesbian couples prove that their living arrangements were similar to those of married couples: cohabitation, joint
accounts, proof of financial interdependence, and a sworn statement from
69
the two people that they were "each other's sole domestic partner."
The partnership arrangement was limited to those who are unable to
because of laws prohibiting marriage of persons of the same
marry
70
sex.

Some companies were forced to extend domestic partnership benefits.
For instance, Woodward & Lothrop, a large department store in the
Washington, D.C. area, offered discount benefits to employees'
unmarried partners if the employee would sign a statement of financial
interdependence. 7' This would be available to both heterosexual and
homosexual partners. Likewise, a Virginia Marriott health club and the

65. A publication offering strategies for negotiating with employers is titled
See supra note 62.

NEGOTIATiNG FOR EQUAL BENEFris.

66. Badgett, supra note 8, at 28.

67. Id.
68. Barron, supra note 10, at Al.
69. Id.

70. Id. Three foreign governments have provided for marriage by persons of the
same sex: Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. A Swede Dealfor Couples, ADVOCATE,
July 12, 1994, at 16.

71.

See Leigh Jackson, Woodies to Extend Benefits: UnmarriedPartnersto Get

Discounts, WASH. POsT, Feb. 15, 1990, at El.
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American Automobile Association in Potomac, Maryland, provided
partnership benefits upon being sued for discriminatory treatment
involving marriage and partnership. 72 These companies, like others,
settled the case by offering the benefits requested before the suit could

be brought to court.
Smaller companies, perhaps more cost conscious of health and leave
benefits, have nonetheless provided domestic partnership benefits. For
instance, in 1991, Lotus Development Corporation allowed homosexual
employees who have "long-term" partners to sign contracts to qualify
them for the same benefits offered to employees' married spouses.73
Ben and Jerry's ice cream is another small business providing domestic
partnership benefits.74 Cost concerns for these smaller companies are
associated with fear of catastrophic medical expenses. This fear is AIDS
generated. Negotiation with Lotus was illustrative: "The company
required 'some educating,' for example, on costs. The discussions
'danced,'.. .around certain topics, like catastrophic illness: 'We kept
saying, Is it AIDS? Nobody would say the word AIDS."'" But fear
of a cost burden has not materialized.76 Indeed, at least two health
insurance companies have extended domestic partnership benefits to their
employees: Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts and Kaiser
Permanente of Northern California.7 7
Employers also fear that employees will falsely claim someone as a
domestic partner.78 In addition, there are added administrative costs
due to Internal Revenue Code regulations. Because the employer's
contribution to the health benefit policy of the domestic partner is treated
as ordinary income to the employee, there is a taxable event that must
72. Jill Walker, Va. Health Club, AAA Bow to Gay Couple's Bid for Discount,
WASH. POST, June 15, 1991, at B8.
73.
at 12.
74.

Lotus Offers Benefitsfor Homosexual Pairs,N.Y. TIMEs, Sept 7, 1991,

§ 1,

Barbara P. Noble, A Quiet Liberationfor Gay and Lesbian Employees, N.Y.

TIMEs, June 13, 1993, § 3, at 4.

75. Barbara P. Noble, Benefits for Domestic Partners,N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1992,

§ 3, at 23.
76. When Berkeley, California extended medical benefits to live-in partners of
employees, many predicted that insurance costs for the municipality would rise
dramatically. This has not occurred. Smoking and exercise are better predictors of who
will file insurance claims. Claudia H. Deutsch, Insurancefor Domestic Partners,N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1991, § 3, at 23.

77.
78.

Badgett, supra note 8, at 30.
Id. at 28-29.

be addressed. This is unique to domestic partners and not to married
couples because the Internal Revenue Code79specifically exempts married

couples from the ordinary income aspect.

Homophobia is another fear. Businesses and political entities are
subject to the same social pressures as individuals. As domestic
partnerships are, by implication or specific directive, associated with

homosexuals, any business or political base is subject to bias against gay
and lesbian persons.80 Fear of public reaction may have prompted
some of the larger companies to delay implementation of domestic
partnerships. Yet, it is interesting to note, most of these companies have
limited the partnerships to persons of the same sex.
Schools and universities are particularly sensitive to homophobic
pressures because of the necessity of soliciting contributions from donors
and operating budgets from state legislatures.8" Nonetheless, "by the

end of [1994], every Ivy League university will provide domestic partner

benefits for same-sex partners."'

2

State universities are more vulnera-

ble to political pressures, but domestic partnerships exist at the
Universities of Minnesota, Iowa, Vermont, the City University of New
York, and Rutgers, 3 and a number of others are discussing the

issueY'

Stanford University, for example, provides benefits for both

heterosexual and homosexual couples, and student benefits are different

79. One company, HBO, includes the value of the benefits to an employee's
taxable wages in his or her annual W-2 form. In 1993, this cost was estimated to be
about $1,300 in taxes and health-plan contributions for an employee making $50,000.
Barbara P. Noble, HBO GrantsBenefits to Staff's Same-Sex Partners, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 1993, at D3. "Signing up a domestic partner for health and dental coverage adds as
much as $3,880 to a Harvard employee's taxable income, for instance, increasing income
tax payments and possibly even FICA payments." Badgett, supra note 8, at 29.
80. For instance, for twelve years the mayors of Burlington, Vermont, were at least
liberal, if not actually socialist. Yet Burlington elected its first Republican mayor in
three decades in 1993 because of the Democrat's "advocacy of a plan to extend healthcare coverage to the unmarried partners of city employees." Health Plan Blamed in
Vermont Mayor's Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, § 1, at 29 [hereinafter Health]. But
see Ian Fisher, Cuomo Decides to Extend Domestic-PartnerBenefits, N.Y. TIMEs, June

29, 1994, at B4. Reporting that two weeks earlier Vermont became the first state to
extend health and dental insurance to unmarried homosexual and heterosexual partners.
81. For example, at Ohio State University, a proposal for same-sex couples to live
in married student housing was met with so much opposition the state legislators are
considering legislation that would prohibit this. Maria Newman, Rutgers Sued for Ban
on Health Benefits to Gay Partners,N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1994, at B4.
82. Badgett, supra note 8, at 26-27. The author estimates that "[t]wenty-four
colleges and universities offer health care benefits to lesbian and gay employees'
domestic partners-at least five also recognize opposite-sex partners." Id. at 26.
83. Rutgers provided benefits to same-sex partners after five gay and lesbian
students sued the university and the State of New Jersey. See Newman, supra note 81,
at B4.
84. Badgett, supra note 8, at 27.

Domestic Partnership

[VOL. 32: 163, 1995]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

from those extended to employees. At Stanford, "[t]o share a university
apartment with a partner and use the library or the gym, students must
have 'an established long-term domestic partnership with a mutual
commitment similar to that of marriage' and 'share the necessities of life
and responsibility for their common welfare."'8 5 Smith and Dartmouth
colleges require same-sex couples to pledge they would marry if legally
allowed to do so. 6
Without the statutory or common law formalities of marriage,
businesses and universities have established their own guidelines as to
what constitutes the status of domestic partnership. Typical elements of
domestic partnership include:
(1)
Minimum time requirements, either before a partner is eligible for
benefits or between partnerships if one is dissolved. Time requirements range
from no requirement... to twelve months.

(2)

Evidence of financial interdependence, particularly shared assets and

debts;

(3)
Sharing a joint residence, whether rented or owned;
(4)
Boundaries for the relationship, including exclusivity, no close blood
relationship, and no current legal marriage;
(5)

plans.8 7

Naming the partner as a beneficiary of life insurance or pension

Because none of these is a product of government regulation or
oversight, businesses and universities are able to change them at will.
It is safe to assume that the requirements shall continue to modify as the
practice becomes more common. Also, litigation concerning discrimination, privacy, freedom of association, and equal protection will have a
significant impact upon eventual uniformity.
B.

The Political Community

During the mid-1980s, Berkeley, California, became the first American
municipality to offer medical benefits to a live-in partner of either a

85. Stanford: Giving Benefits and Apartments to Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1990, § 1, at 39. More recently, Stanford extended health and dental benefits to
same-sex domestic partners and "[p]artners will also be able to audit university classes,
their children will qualify for tuition grant programs, and the partners will qualify for
library and athletics privileges." Anthony DePalma, Benefits Granted to Gay Partners,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1992, at A13.
86. Badgett, supra note 8, at 29.
87. Id. Also, compare these elements with those required for status of marriage;
see supra note 24 and accompanying text.

homosexual or heterosexual employee.88 Since then additional municipalities have also done so: Madison, Wisconsin; Seattle, Washington; 9
and Cambridge, Massachusetts to name a few. These steps demonstrate
that domestic partnership benefits have national applicability.9 ° These

American cities reflect a trend evidenced in the 1990 census that
reported 4.9 million unmarried-partner households in the United States.
These couples, whether homosexual or heterosexual, are seeking legal
and economic benefits without the obligations of marriage. They have
found that living wills, durable powers of attorney, and valid last wills
and testaments do not provide the security necessary at illness or death,
and that while living and well, there are insufficient benefits to ratify
what the partners believe is a functioning family.

Larger cities have now adopted similar domestic partnership benefits.
For instance, one is New York City, the city around which the historic

Braschi case was centered. In that case, Miguel Braschi, 32, a hair salon
manager, filed suit in 1987 against Stahl Associates, a real estate firm
that sought to evict him after his lover, Leslie Blanchard, died of
AIDS.9 1 They had shared the apartment for ten years. In a four to two

ruling, the New York Court of Appeals recognized a new definition of
family: "[A] family includes two adult lifetime partners whose
relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial

commitment and interdependence."'

This allowed for the surviving

partner to inherit the rent-controlled apartment. In the year of the
decision, 1989, Mayor Edward Koch ordered "paid bereavement leave

88. Deutsch, supra note 76, § 3, at 23.
89. In Seattle, for instance, 476 of the city's 10,000 employees were registered as
domestic partners and an estimated 70% of them were heterosexual. Kevin Sack, Albany
to Let InsuranceLaw Cover Partners,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at B1, B10.
90. See also In 2 Cities, Unmarried Get Marriage Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1992, at B9 (Cambridge, Mass. and Sacramento, Calif.); Susan Scherreik, The Practical
Partof Living Together, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1993, § 1, at 33 (Denver, Colo.); Health,
supra note 80, § 1, at 29. But see Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, Nos. C6-94-1583, C894-1584, CX94-1585, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 120 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1995)
(holding that a grant of health care benefits to persons related to or living with a
municipal employee is a matter of statewide concern and Minneapolis' resolution
granting insurance benefits to same-sex domestic partners and an expansive list of
relatives not defined as dependents independently is ultra vires and without legal force).
91. Marianne Yen, Court Adds Gay Couple to Definition ofFamily, WASH. POST,
July 7, 1989, at A3.
92. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989); see also
In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (awarding
guardianship of Kowalski to her lesbian partner of four years rather than her relatives,
as this is what the severely injured Kowalski would have wanted). Both cases
incorporate an expanded definition of family. But see Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health
& Hosp., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing the distinctive status of
marriage as providing benefits under a state's definition of immediate family).

[VOL. 32: 163, 1995]

Domestic Partnership
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

be granted to New York City employees who live as unmarried couples,
homosexual or heterosexual, when their partners or partners' close
family members die. ' 93 The New York City Council did not expand
the benefits even though legislation was introduced. 94

In1993, Mayor David Dinkins, signed an executive order creating a
city registry in which city residents or nonresident municipal workers
who live together could register as unmarried domestic partners. 9 This
was a significant development for the city. Registration costs $20 and

the parties must complete a notarized affidavit; the affidavit can be
terminated for $15. The benefits vary:
Some couples have used their new status to obtain discount prices for health
club memberships and car rentals. One woman, armed with the domestic
partner certificate, confronted a funeral parlor that had refused to accept her as
a close relative. She was then allowed to make future funeral arrangements for
their new status to make
her ill partner. Many other couples have used
symbolic, political points about their sexuality.96

The change in New York City came about in part because of the
change in New York State. "Reversing a 54-year-old policy, the Cuomo
administration... lifted New York State's prohibition against providing
family health insurance that covers the domestic partners of homosexuals
Referring to the 1989 Braschi
and unmarried heterosexuals. 97

decision, state administrators accepted domestic partners as a family and
provided for a standard of interdependence to determine the existence of

93. David W. Dunlap, Koch Grants Paid Leave to Unmarried Couples, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1989, at B3.
94. Felicia R. Lee, Bill Would Give Unwed Couples Equal Benefits, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 21, 1990, at B2.
95. Alan Finder, Rights of 'DomesticPartners'Broadenedby Dinkins Order,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at Al. Six weeks after the order became effective, 109 couples had
registered, 3 were heterosexual. Jonathan P. Hicks, A Legal Threshold Is Crossed By
Gay Couples in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al. But by the end of 1993,
over 1400 couples had registered. Mireya Navarro, New York Extends Health Benefits
to Domestic Partners of City Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1993, at B1. The
Executive Order settled a lawsuit brought against the city in 1988 by the Lesbian and
Gay Teachers Association alleging discrimination. Sack, supra note 89, at B10; Gay
Benefits Issue to Go to Trial,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, § 1, at 24; see Philip S. Gutis,

Gay Teachers Sue for Benefits for Longtime Companions,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1989, at
B2.

96. Lynda Richardson, Proud, Offlcial Partners,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, § 1,
at 37-38.
97. Sack, supra note 89, at Bl. But see Kevin Sack, Albany G.O.P. Grappling
with Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, § 1, at 23.

the partnership. In June 1994, Governor Cuomo announced that he
would extend insurance benefits to domestic partners of gay and lesbian
employees. 98 At present, the benefits are contemplated only for
' 99
homosexual couples, since "opposite-sex partners have other options.
New York City extended health benefits to both homosexual and
heterosexual domestic partners at the end of 1993."0'
Other efforts to establish domestic partnerships within the political
community have not met with the equanimity of New York. For

instance, allowing for heterosexual and homosexual domestic partners to

register in San Francisco, California in 1989, resulted in a city referendum. 10 1 In addition, for the third consecutive year, the U.S. House of
Representatives has prohibited the government of the District of
Columbia from using any money to implement its domestic partnership
law.10 2 Furthermore, by an overwhelming margin, the voters of
Austin, Texas, repealed a municipal domestic partnership ordinance on
May 7, 1994.103
Recent political advances by the gay and lesbian community, as well
as media attention given to President Clinton's efforts to end the ban on
gays and lesbians in the military, have resulted in a number of anti-gay
initiatives throughout the country.1" These initiatives take the form

98.

Fisher, supra note 80, at B4. "There are about 162,000 employees in the

executive branch and in the state university system." Id.
99. Id.
100. See Navarro, supra note 95, at B1; see Not Enoughfor Domestic Partners,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, §1, at 20 (suggesting that health care benefits be extended to
city workers).
101. See Cynthia Gomey, Making It Official: The Law & Live-Ins, WASH. POST,
July 5, 1989, at Cl. The partnership came about through registration and allowed for
hospital visitation rights, paid bereavement leave if the employer is the City of San
Francisco, health insurance coverage for city employees' partners and "respect." See
also Cynthia Gorney, ProtestImpedes PartnersLaw, WASH. POST, July 7, 1989, at D3.
Note: On September 12, 1994, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed domestic partner
legislation which would have allowed 500,000 unmarried couples to register with the
state. Jerry Gillam, Wilson Signs Bill Ending No-PantsRules for Women, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1994, at Al.
102. Kristina Campbell, Three Times is Not the CharmforD.C.'sPartnersMeasure,
WASH. BLADE, July 15, 1994, at A8. The District of Columbia measure would allow
cohabiting unmarried adults over the age of 18 to register with the city; health benefits
would be allowed for city employees. Washington Ordinance Tests Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at A15; Domestic partnerships Backed in Washington, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1992, at A14; Kent Jenkins, Jr., House PanelAffirms D.C.Partnership
Law, WASH. POST, June 11, 1992, at C3; Maggie S. Tucker, D.C. Domestic PartnersGo
On the Record Despite Law's Limits, WASH. POST, June 29, 1993, at B1.

103. John Gallagher, PartnershipDisagreement,ADVOCATE, June 14, 1994, at 22.
104. See generally Zamansky, supra note 53; Suzanne Goldberg, Pre-election

Challenges: A Powerful Weapon Against Anti-Gay Initiatives, II LAMBDA UPDATE 1
(1994).
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of measures placed on ballots asking the voters to rescind state laws or
allow for a state constitutional amendment repealing any existing laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The state
constitutional amendment in Colorado provides:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts,
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person
or class of persons to have or claim and minority status, quota preferences,
This Section of the Constitution
protected status or claim of discrimination.
shall be in all respects self-executing. 5

Similar efforts have been introduced in other American political
communities: Oregon, Idaho, Washington, Missouri, Maine, Florida,
Nevada, and Michigan. Some of these efforts were at the state level and
some were directed towards municipalities; many were organized by the
U.S. Citizens Alliance or the Traditional Values Coalition. They
contribute in part to a growing political controversy involving, in

general, individual versus community standards, and in particular, private
partnerships between two adults which may include sexual conduct.
II. THE LEGAL CONTROVERSY
A.

In Opposition

There were very few objections to the California Supreme Court's
Marvin decision in 1976 which allowed recovery under a theory of
contract for persons living in a meretricious relationship. 116 And, other
than objections concerning the practical application, there were very few
objections to the New York Court of Appeals' Braschi decision in 1989
which allowed a homosexual lover to inherit the deceased lover's rent
control as a surviving family member.0 7 Perhaps it was because in
both cases, the relationship was over and there was no further opportunity for sex. Not true for domestic partnership. There has been significant

105. CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
106. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976); see also supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
107. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989); see supra
text accompanying notes 92-94.

opposition to both heterosexual and homosexual partnership, and
particular vehemence over all gay-rights measures.'
The basis for the opposition can result from bigotry, fear of AIDS,

discrimination, or ignorance. Many people believe that a gay or lesbian
person chooses his or her lifestyle, a lifestyle that is often distorted by
media coverage of such events as Gay Pride parades, and since that
lifestyle is different from assumed national values, efforts to prohibit it
result. An example is found in the comments of New York State
Senator John R. Kuhl, Jr., concerning a future vote on a pending gayrights bill in New York:
I don't condone their lifestyle. I think it's their choice and they have to live
with it. I look at it different than an Italian person or blacks or Chinese, people
who have genetic traits that they can't do anything about. Sexual orientation
is their choice and I don't think it's our place to force people that might have
a moral opposition to it to have to put up with it and condone it."°

But then there are motives for supporting anti-gay initiatives that arise
because of rational religious interpretation, a perceived value of cultural
uniformity, or an ardent belief that such liberties as domestic partnership
in particular, or gay-rights in general, are bad for America."' Thus,
in Idaho in 1993, the Idaho Citizens Alliance proposed an initiative for
the voters providing:
Section 67-8002: SPECIAL RIGHTS FOR PERSONS WHO ENGAGE INHOMOsExUAL
BEHAVIOR PROHMIED. No agency, department, or political subdivision of the
State of Idaho shall enact or adopt any law, rule, policy, or agreement which
has the purpose or effect of granting minority status to persons who engage in
homosexual behavior, solely on the basis of such behavior; therefore,
affirmative action, quota preferences, and special classifications such as 'sexual
orientation' or similar designations shall not be established on the basis of
homosexuality ....
Section 67-8003: EXTENSION OF LEGAL INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE TO
DOMEsTIc PARTNERSHIPS BASED ON HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED.
Same-sex marriages and domestic partnerships are hereby declared to be against
public policy and shall not be legally recognized -in any manner by an agency,
department, or political subdivision of the State of Idaho."'

108. See Bettina Boxall, Anti-Gay-Rights Measures Ignite Aggressive Battles in 7
States, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at A5.
109. Sack, supra note 97, § 1, at 23; see also Titus, supra note 18, at 339-40
(arguing the mistaken belief that all people are free to have sex with whomever they
please).
110. The rationality of arguments concerning, for example, gay and lesbian parents,
sexual molestation, and psychosexual orientation are recent and continue to develop.
See, e.g., Flaks, supra note 27.
111. ACLU v. Echohawk, 857 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Idaho 1993).
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Also in 1993, in Oregon, Lon T. Mabon, of the Oregon Citizens
Alliance, submitted an initiative for the ballot which would amend the
state constitution to provide:
Section 41: MINORITY STATUS BASED ON HOMOSEXUALITY PROHIBITED.
(1) In the State of Oregon, including all political subdivisions and
government units, minority status shall not apply to homosexuality; therefore,
affirmative action, quotas, special class status or special classifications such as
"sexual orientation," "domestic partnerships" or similar designations shall not
be established on the basis of homosexuality.
[(2)](a) The State of Oregon, political subdivisions and all units of state and
local government shall not grant marital status or spousal benefits on the basis
of homosexuality."'

In California the Riverside Citizens for Responsible Behavior sought
to place the following initiative on the ballot in 1991:
(3) City shall not enact any policy or law which "defines homosexuality,
bisexuality, sexual orientation, affectional preference, or gay or lesbian conduct
as a fundamental human right;" ... or "promotes, encourages, endorses,
legitimizes or justifies homosexuality."
(5) "No City monies may be used directly or indirectly to fund any
encourages, endorses,
individual, activity or organization which promotes,
3
legitimizes or justifies homosexual conduct."'

These state initiatives often had parallel activity at the more local
level. In Marietta, Georgia, the Cobb County Board of Commissioners
passed a resolution condemning homosexuality and eliminating $110,000
in arts funding in its 1994 budget.114 The Board's action was precipitated by a resident writing to a commissioner to complain about
references to homosexuality in a play at Theater in the Square. The
Board decided that "the life styles advocated by the gay community"
were incompatible with Cobb County standards. 5 Likewise, Commissioners of Williamson County, Texas, refused to give a real estate tax
112. Mabon v. Keisling, 856 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Or. 1993); see DeParrie v. Keisling,

862 P.2d 494 (Or. 1993).
113. Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1013,
1019-20,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 651 (1991) (holding that the initiative was constitutionally
defective and refusing to place the initiative on the ballot).
114. Peter Applebome, Cotinty's Anti-Gay Move Catches Few By Surprise, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1993, § 1, at 18.
115. Id.

abatement to Apple Computer, Inc. which planned to build an $80
million office complex on a patch of land just above Austin. The
Commissioners cited Apple's policy of domestic partnership which
grants health benefits to partners of gay
and lesbian employees as the
11 6
reason for refusing the tax abatement.
The vehemence of the opponents to domestic partnership in general,
and gay and lesbian rights in particular, presage future initiatives,

litigation, and animosity. Yet, the visibility and the concommitant
discussion-even though expensive and litigious--contribute to a sense
of identity for the gay and lesbian community and to a greater understanding of the homosexual person by the heterosexual community. This
is a significant contribution to the development of any due process rights
in the future.117
B. In Defense
Organizations such as the Americans for Civil Liberties Union and the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund have been persistent, and
most recently successful, in the defense of liberties on behalf of gays
and lesbians. Included among these liberties is domestic partnership.
Defenses advocated by litigators are as practical as organizing at the
local political level for legislative relief; defenses include the gamut of
federal and state constitutional guarantees which assist minority
communities such as gays and lesbians. Following the 1986 landmark
sodomy case of Bowers v. Hardwick,"' academics, commentators, and
litigators devoted increased attention towards these and other constitutional guarantees in an effort to expand the rights of gay and lesbian
persons." 9 Today, litigation defenses would include rights to privacy,120 Equal Rights Amendments (ERA), 121 state statutes prohibiting

116. Apple Denied a Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1993, at D7; Sam H.
Verhovek, County in Texas Snubs Apple Over Unwed-PartnerPolicies, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 2, 1993, at Al. Later, the county commissioners would have another vote and

change their minds.
117. For a discussion of the necessity of a due process argument for the gay and
lesbian community, see infra notes 152-210 and accompanying text.
118.

478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the due process clause of the United States

Constitution did not confer on homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy).

119. See generally Cain, supra note 55.
120. See, e.g., Hohengarten, supra note 28 (arguing that state has an affirmative
duty to remove obstacles to same-sex marriage so that gay and lesbian persons may
enjoy the privacy of this fundamental relationship); see also Commonwealth v. Wasson,

842 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Ky. 1992) (deciding that the state's sodomy statute violated the
state's guarantee of privacy).
121. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (using the Hawaii Equal

Rights Amendment to raise the level ofjudicial scrutiny to strict under equal protection
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discrimination, 122 the First Amendment,1 23 and, the two which follow, equal protection and due process of law.
1.

Equal Protection

One commentator has explained the equal protection defense: "If
homosexuals, as a class, are treated differently from other classes of
persons, then the state must justify the differential treatment in the same
way the state must justify classifications based on race and sex." 124 In
spite of initial setbacks, there have been recent successes.
For instance, in Cammermeyer v. Aspin,' 5 an Army colonel who had
served admirably as a nurse and then in the National Guard from 1961
until 1992 was discharged because she admitted being a lesbian, but she
did not admit to any sexual conduct with women. In Spring, 1994, the
federal district court in Washington held that the army regulation
banning persons who merely acknowledge homosexual orientation was

not rationally related to the government's legitimate interest in maintaining readiness and combat effectiveness of military forces, and therefore
126
violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.
This case forms another element in the saga of lifting the ban against
Its effect, however, has yet to be
gays and lesbians in the military."

analysis); Singer v. Ham, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (deciding that the state
Equal Rights Amendment was inapplicable to change the basic definition of marriage).
122. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1387 (D.C.
Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), aff'd, No. 92-CN-737, 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. Ct. App. Jan. 19,
1995) (deciding that statutes were inapplicable to change the definition of marriage).
123. See generally Hunter, supra note 56.
124. Cain, supra note 55, at 1617-18; see also John F. Niblock, Anti-Gay Initiatives:
A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153 (1993) (advocating
heightened judicial scrutiny for gay and lesbian persons in conjunction with an equal
protection argument); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal
Protectionfor Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV.915 (1989).
125. Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
126. See id. at 929.
127. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheny, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 665 (1992) (requiring the Army to offer a rational basis for a regulation discharging
an officer for her acknowledgement that she was a lesbian); Watkins v. United States
Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (granting equal protection relief because
the Army denied the plaintiff equal protection of the laws by discharging him and
refusing to reenlist him solely on the basis of his homosexuality); BenShalom v. Marsh,
703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990) (holding that
exclusion of service members for homosexual status alone without concurrent conduct

tested on appeal) 2
Professor Patricia Cain writes that, "the greatest hope for equal
protection in furthering gay and lesbian rights is that a court, in applying
rational basis review, will require the state to offer proof that the
discriminatory rule is indeed rational."' 29 This is an aggressive policy
of rationality; the military must submit actual evidence of the rationality

of its policies. 3° For instance, in Cammermeyer, the court ruled that

the lesbian colonel who was discharged because of her admission of

homosexual orientation met her burden of proof to negate the military's

proffered justification for its ban on gay and lesbian soldiers.'
Thus,
the court held that she had "met her burden of negating the proffered
justifications for the government's policy ... [and] [t]he Government
[had] failed to offer any evidence.., that its justifications [were] based

on anything but prejudice ....

The government [had] discriminated

against [her] ... and ... [had] failed to demonstrate a rational basis for

doing so.' 32
The equal protection argument involves a careful analysis. That is,
when subjecting laws to analysis under equal protection, what level of
proof must the court apply? There are three possibilities: a rational

basis, a quasi-suspect class, often associated with gender discrimination, 133 and a strict approach, most often associated with racial classifi-

is not rationally related to any articulated legitimate government interest).
128. Other opinions in favor of applying strict scrutiny to the military ban against
gays and lesbians have been reversed on appeal. See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543
(D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445
(1993).

129.

Cain, supra note 55, at 1620. This is an active rational review process,

thereby forcing the military to justify the exclusion through evidence. See Buttino v. FBI,
801 F. Supp. 298, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
130. Recent cases evidence success with this policy of active rational basis review.
See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655
(1992) (court held that military policies that simply give effect to society's prejudices
do not suffice under a rational basis test); Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense,
808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (citing the equal protection claim of the plaintiff,
the court held that a policy of exclusion cannot simply defer to the military judgment
as sufficient, but must consider the factual basis as rational).
131. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 924. To meet this burden the court accepted
evidence of President Clinton's statements, the presence of homosexuals serving in the
military, and a RAND Report stating that homosexuals will not affect military cohesion
and that public disapproval of homosexuals in the military is not a valid concern.
132. Id. at 924, 926. The case had been stayed pending President Clinton's attempt
to change the policy on the ban.
133. District Judge Thelton Henderson ruled that lesbian and gay litigants
constituted a quasi-suspect class for equal protection purposes, but his decision was
overruled on appeal. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). For arguments that
gays and lesbians deserve strict scrutiny, see Zamansky, supra note 53, at 251-54;
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cations, which requires the state to prove a compelling state interest."'
One author argues that since the due process clause has been primarily
used to protect "traditional" substantive rights from the short term
intrusion of elected majorities' 13' and homosexuals do not engage in
traditional conduct, equal protection requires a "heightened justification"36
for state discrimination against those engaged in such conduct.
Others have continued to develop sexual arguments for heightened
Instead, the arguscrutiny,137 but the possibilities are not good.3
ment used is likely to be that of Cammermeyer:
Initially, the court must determine whether the challenged classification serves
a legitimate governmental purpose. If the court answers this question in the
affirmative, the court must then determine whether the discriminatory
classification is rationally related to the achievement of that legitimate purpose.

that is based on prejudice or bias is not rational
A discriminatory classification
law.131

as a matter of

It is important to note that Cammermeyer concerned the status of the
lesbian colonel as a person who had simply announced her sexual

orientation as homosexual.

Conduct was not at issue.

40

However,

4

because of the adverse ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,1' homosexual

Niblock, supra note 124, at 167-77.
134. But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Justices Brennan,
Douglas, White, and Marshall held that sex is a suspect classification requiring strict
scrutiny).
135. See Sunstein, supra note 55, at 1174.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Niblock, supra note 124; Trosino, supra note 28 (making an
argument of similarity to racial classifications). But see Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. 1979) (explaining that the court would have applied strict judicial scrutiny if it
had found sexual discrimination); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (requiring
state to provide a compelling state interest to justify its gender classification prohibiting
same-sex marriage).
138. But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (remanding to the lower
court for a determination to assess the compelling state interest associated with
prohibition of same-sex marriages).
139. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 915.
140. Id. at 918. Conduct has been defined as "any bodily contact, actively
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of
satisfying sexual desires or any bodily contact which a reasonable person would
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts."
Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Policy
on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces, July 19, 1993, at 2.
141. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Supreme Court ruled in a five to four opinion that
homosexuals did not have a fundamental due process right to engage in sodomy. Id. at

conduct--sodomy-is without protection even though it could be argued
that heterosexual sodomy would be protected under a right to privacy. 42 The adverse consequences of conduct and the legacy of Bowers
v. Hardwick prompted judges to respond "to the equal protection claims
of gay and lesbian litigants by saying that until Hardwick is reversed, no
such claim can be recognized."' 43 In confronting this difficulty,
"litigators have, whenever possible, distanced themselves from Hardwick
by claiming that their clients have been victims of discrimination based
on 'status' and by arguing that 'conduct' should not be presumed from
status."'" This argument prevailed in Cammermeyer: "[T]o the extent
the Government's policy is based on the unfounded presumption that
servicemembers with a homosexual orientation will engage in proscribed
homosexual conduct, the policy is not rationally based."'
It is
therefore unconstitutional.
It could be argued that when the Supreme Court of Hawaii remanded
to the circuit court to determine if prohibition of same-sex couples from
marrying violated equal protection of the law, 4 6 the court was rejecting unfounded presumptions. That is, the court wanted the circuit court

to justify its reasons as to why persons of the same sex could not marry,
This confrontation-aggressive rationality-over the exact nature of the
reason for the denial of equal protection is an argument advocated by
proponents of gay and lesbian rights.'47 Also implicit in the Hawaii
decision is sexual conduct, not simply acknowledgement, even though
the court specifically states the decision is not about homosexual
rights,
48
but rather about the rights of same-sex couples to marry.
Eventually, Bowers v. Hardwick may well be overturned. 14 Indeed,
state legislatures are revoking sodomy statutes, 150 and in Kentucky, the
state's highest court ruled that a state homosexual sodomy law violates

196.

142. Prior cases had found no privacy right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy.
See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).

143. Cain, supra note 55, at 1618.
144. Id. at 1621-22. The author suggests that "rational basis analysis ought to
require more than mere conjecture." Id. at 1630.
145. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 925 (footnote omitted).
146. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 77 (Haw. 1993).
147. See supra text accompanying note 129.
148. See infra text accompanying note 155.
149. See generally Janet E. Halley, ReasoningAbout Sodomy: Act and Identity in
and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993).
150. See NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1993). Nevada is the exception
in that after repealing its statute, it was reinstated in 1993.
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the equal protection clause of that state's constitution."' Some gay
and lesbian advocates argue for litigation strategies that would emphasize
the inherent rights of gay and lesbian persons to engage in sexual
conduct as a due process right, while simultaneously challenging class-

based discrimination based on equal protection."' This strategy would
place more emphasis upon the lifestyle of the gay or lesbian person,
greater emphasis upon the immutable characteristic of the gay or lesbian
sexual orientation, and greater acknowledgement of the values inherent
in the person, even though he or she is homosexual. Of course, these
forays are affected by developments concerning domestic partnership.
Surely if domestic partnership incorporates responsibilities as well as
benefits, due process between gay and lesbian partners will be advanced.
2. Due Process
If equal protection argues that gay and lesbian persons cannot be
prosecuted or denied benefits of a law that exempts heterosexuals or
provides services to heterosexuals without at least a rational basis, then
due process argues for even more. That is, "[s]ubstantive due process
arguments... [involve] the fundamental importance of love, affection,
intimacy, commitment, expressions of concern, and all other forms of
conduct that lesbians and gay men embrace as part of their lesbian and

gay lifestyle."' 53 Conduct is definitely involved, not simply status, and
the central focus is on personhood 4

This ascendence of personhood and thus due process protection for
homosexuals is in part due to the abolition of the sodomy laws; if
Bowers v. Hardwick were specifically overruled it would make a
significant difference. Under Bowers v. Hardwick,simply by determining a gay or lesbian status, a person is an assumed sodomite and thus,

a criminal, "morally weak and thus unfit for employment in responsible
151. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). See also State
v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (rex. Ct. App. 1992) (invalidating the state's homosexual
sodomy statute on the basis of the state's constitutional guarantee of privacy), rev'd, 869

S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). See generally Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning About
Homosexuality: A Commentary on JanetHalley's "ReasoningAbout Sodomy: Act and
Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick", 79 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1789-98 (1993)
(differentiating Michael Hardwick from Jeffrey Wasson).
152. Cain, supra note 55, at 1628.
153. Id. at 1635-36.
154. For an excellent explanation of personhood, see Rubenfeld, supra note 11.

positions."

5

"So long as gay men and lesbians were presumed to

engage in acts of criminal sodomy, employers could argue that they
should not be forced to hire criminals and landlords could argue that

they should not be forced to rent to criminals."' 56
With abolition of the sodomy statutes through legislative or judicial
action, it is possible to address the due process rights of gays and

lesbians. In other words, once the automatic criminal nexus is lifted
from gays and lesbians-and recall that heterosexuals engage in sodomy

too-the person of the gay and lesbian becomes the center of attention
and this personhood can be recognized within due process." 7 "If
litigants continue to argue that the interests at stake are important, even
if they are not 'fundamental,' then perhaps substantive due process

claims would begin to enjoy a form of 'active' rational basis review
similar to that available for equal protection claims." '58 In part, this
is why litigation over marriage is so important, it presages family,'59
although it is more logical to think that once the idea of same-sex family
takes hold, same-sex marriage may come next. 16° But the important
thing is that persons begin to recognize that gays and lesbians are

capable of forming families and thus are deserving of protection under
due process.

In Baker v. Nelson,' 6 1 Richard Baker and James McConnell went to

the courthouse to apply for a marriage license and their application was

155. Cain, supra note 55, at 1587. For a recent story concerning a homosexual
who lost his employment because of his sexual orientation, see James B. Stewart, Annals
of Law: Gentleman's Agreement, NEW YORKER, June 13, 1994, at 74.
156. Cain, supra note 55, at 1588. But see Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 25 Cal. App. 4th 251, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (1994), rev. grantedand opinion
superseded by Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 880 P.2d 111, 33 Cal. Rptr.

2d 567 (1994) (allowing a landlord to refuse to rent to an unmarried couple because it

would implicate her in what she believes is the sin of sex outside of marriage); see also
Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (holding that landlord need
not comply with state statute barring marital status discrimination if compliance would
violate religious beliefs and state cannot prove a compelling state interest).
157. Biblical prohibitions cannot be as easily eradicated by many. See, e.g., Titus,
supra note 18, at 342-43.
158. Cain, supra note 55, at 1639-40. The Supreme Court has decided that the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution does not confer on homosexuals a fundamental right
to engage in sodomy. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986); see also
Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
159. For arguments supporting alternative families in adoption, custody and foster
care, see Russman, supra note 28. See generally William B. Rubenstein, We Are
Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay
Relationships, 8 J.L. & POL. 89 (1991).
160. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1432 (recommending starting with
domestic partnership ordinances and working up to same-sex marriages over time).
161. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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denied by the clerk because they were of the same sex. The couple
appealed the clerk's decision on due process grounds, but the court
denied them their appeal, relying on the legal definition of marriage as
that between persons of the opposite sex.162 Furthermore, the court
pointed out, "[t]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 1is
63

not a charter for restructuring [marriage] by judicial legislation."'
This was in the early seventies.

In the early nineties, two District of Columbia men were denied a
marriage license and challenged the denial based on the District of
Columbia marriage statute,"6 the District of Columbia anti-discrimination ordinance,' 65 and due process of law. The court stated that the

"true due process inquiry involves not the fundamental nature of an
abstract 'right to marry,' but rather, whether the constitution confers a
fundamental right upon persons of the same sex to marry one anoth-

er.'

66

In rejecting their appeal, the District of Columbia Superior

Court followed the definitional aspect of marriage as a societal

recognition that it takes a man and a woman to form a marital relationship. 67 Litigation continues on that case, but another case has caught
the attention of legal scholars. This case occurs in Hawaii.

162. The definitional response of the courts would be utilized in subsequent
decisions. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); De Santo v.
Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (two persons of the same sex cannot enter
into a common law marriage).

163. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
164. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-101 to 121 (1981).
165. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 2533 (1981).
166. Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1387 (D.C. Super. Ct.
June 2, 1992), aff'd, No. 92-CV-737 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1995).
On January 19, 1995 the three judge panel of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, the district's highest appellate court, ruled that the superior court was correct

in upholding the city's refusal to grant a marriage license to two persons of the same
sex.

167. Id. The District of Columbia Superior Court, like other courts, linked its
definitional authority to biblical references. References to Divine Providence also were
included in the rationale for denying interracial marriages in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 3 (1966), where the court quoted the trial judge. See also Adams v. Howerton,
486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1992); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971), appealdismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Craig R. Dean, Legalize Gay Marriage,

N.Y. TIMES, Sept 28, 1991, § 1, at 19.

Baehr v. Lewin"' involved two women, Genora Dancel and Ninia
Baehr, who challenged Hawaii's imposition of an "opposite-sex

restriction" on their right to marry. They met all of the state requirements for marriage, but were denied a license because they were "both

of the same sex and for this reason [were] not capable of forming a valid

marriage contract within the meaning of [the law]."' 69 The plaintiffs

then brought suit, claiming the following: (1) that the state's denial to a
same-sex couple of access to marriage is a violation of the couple's right
to privacy as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution; 70 and (2) that the
denial also is a violation of the right to equal protection of the law and

due process of law as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution.'

In addition, the plaintiffs asserted their homosexuality and claimed a

172
fundamental constitutional right to sexual orientation.
The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that: "(1)

[denial of the license to the plaintiffs] 'does not infringe upon a person's
individuality or lifestyle decisions' and "(2) [denial] 'does not ...
burden ... the ...right to engage in a homosexual lifestyle."" 173 In
addition, the circuit court found that:
(5) ...

"[T]here is no evidence that homosexuals and the homosexual

legislative agenda have failed to gain legislative support .. .";

(6) the

"[pilaintiffshavefailed to show that homosexuals constitute a suspect class for
equal protection analysis . . ."; (7) "the issue of whether homosexuality

constitutes an immutable trait has generated much dispute in the relevant
scientific community"; and (8) [the present law] "is obviously designed to
by sanctioning
promote the general welfare interests of the community
74
traditional man-woman family units and procreation."'

168. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The lesbian couple was joined by a gay male
couple and another lesbian couple in bringing the suit. Id.
169. Id. at 50. See generally John E. Durkin, Comment, Reproductive Technology
and the New Family: Recognizing the Other Mother, 10 1 CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 327 (1994).
170. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 50. Article I, § 6 of the Hawaii Constitution provides:
"The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to
implement this right." HAW. CONST. art I, § 6.
171. Baehr,852 P.2d at 50. Article 1, § 5 of the Hawaii Constitution provides: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be
denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil

rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex
or ancestry." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5.
172. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52.
173. Id. at 53 (quoting circuit court's order). The Hawaii Supreme Court held that
"it is irrelevant, for purposes of the constitutional analysis germane to this case, whether
homosexuals constitute a 'suspect class' because it is immaterial whether the plaintiffs,
or any of them, are homosexual." Id. at 58.
174. Id. at 53-54 (footnote omitted) (quoting circuit court's order).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii was asked to resolve the
issues presented by the plaintiffs based upon the Hawaii Constitution.
It is important to note that this case was brought in state court based on
As in Kentucky v.
the interpretation of the state constitution.
Wasson,'75 where the state supreme court ruled that the state sodomy
statute violated the state guarantee of equal protection, this is another
instance where, "constitutional challenges in state courts may be more
productive than federal challenges."' 7 6
Although basing its opinion on Hawaii law, the court relied heavily on
federal constitutional cases, especially those involved with the issue of
whether or not there is a fundamental right to marry. For instance, the
right to privacy is specifically enumerated in the state constitution and
the court complemented this with a panorama of federal fundamental
right to marry decisions.'7 7 The court concluded, "it would make little
sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of
family life [procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships] and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that
is the foundation of the family in our society." ' Thus, do "same-sex
couples possess a fundamental right" to marry? 7 9 The court, in spite
of its emphasis upon federal cases, decided that for purposes of privacy
or otherwise:
[We do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the
traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it
would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions. Neither do we believe that a right

to same-sex marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered0 liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.'

175.

842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); see supra text accompanying note 145.

Like

Baehr, Wasson also applied heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at__.

176.

Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28,

at 1509.

177. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-56. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Meyer

v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). But see Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59. States may and do
prohibit
be done
178.
179.
180.

marriage. The extent of these prohibitions suggests that further analysis must
before marriage may be conclusively a fundamental right.
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id.

The court then addressed the equal protection argument. Since the
authority to grant licenses to solemnize marriage, "on its face, discriminates based on sex against the applicant couples in the exercise of the

civil right of marriage,"'.'

the equal protection clause of the Hawaii

Constitution is implicated. This equal protection clause is more
extensive than that of the United States Constitution. The Hawaii
Constitution provides that: "no person shall ... be denied the equal
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race,
religion, sex, or ancestry."'2 Thus, unlike the United States Constitution, "the Hawaii Constitution prohibits state-sanctioned discrimination
against any person in the exercise of his or her civil rights on the basis
of sex.""8 3 But first the court had to address whether same-sex
marriage was prohibited by the definition of marriage achieved through
history. This is the definitional argument.
The court did not find the definitional argument of previous cases
dispositive. 4 Instead, the court implied that the equal protection
analysis-federal or state-was not addressed, specifically in analogy to
the Virginia miscegenation case of Loving v. Virginia.185 In that 1966
case, a Black woman and a Caucasian man were married in the District
of Columbia and then returned to their home state of Virginia to
establish their domicile. The couple was indicted for, and subsequently
convicted of, violating Virginia's miscegenation statute, which banned
interracial marriages. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld their
conviction
and the couple appealed to the United States Supreme
18 6
Court.
For the Supreme Court, Loving was essentially an equal protection
case, even though due process is mentioned briefly.'8 7 This equal
protection argument in Loving also resulted from the definitional

181. Id. at 59.
182. Id. at 60 (quoting HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5).

183. Id. ("It is the state's regulation of access to the status of married persons, on
the basis of the applicants' sex, that gives rise to the question whether the applicant
couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws ....).
184. Id. at 60 n.20. But see Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1387 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), aff'd, No. 92-CV-737, 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. Ct.

App. Jan. 19, 1995); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Jones v.

Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
185. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that anti-miscegenation laws violate the United
State Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses);
see also Trosino, supra note 28; Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1504 (Loving is a
favorable analogy for those questioning state law prohibiting same-sex marriage).
186. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3-4.

187. Id. at 12.
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impossibility of marriage between a Caucasian and anyone other than a
Caucasian: "[1]nterracial marriage simply could not exist because the

Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural,"' 88 and the
customs of the state had never included it. Yet, applying strict scrutiny
to the racial classification engendered into the miscegenation laws, the
Court found no compelling reasons to maintain the past custom."8 9
Indeed, the Court found that customs had changed-former vestiges of
slavery were disappearing during the sixties-and thus past custom
should no longer dictate the definitional aspect of marriage. As to the
will of the Deity, the Hawaiian court ratified what the Loving Court
found as well: "[We do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate
authorities on the subject of Divine Will. . ..
The significance of Baehr therefore, is that it couples the racial
prohibitions of Loving with the same-sex prohibitions of the Hawaii
statute, and then finds that since customs changed for the former, why
cannot customs change for the latter. If time allowed mixed-race
couples to marry, time could allow same-sex couples to marry. This
eliminates the argument of decisions that held that it was not a denial of
equal protection, since marriage had never included within its definition,
a same-sex union. This is the unique first step of Baehr, the elimination
of the definitional argument; the second step will then be a consideration
of whether or not it is in fact a denial of equal protection to refuse to
allow marriages between persons of the same sex. But in order to do
this, it is necessary to establish the standard by which to evaluate the
state's claim. Must the state, under strict scrutiny, show a compelling
state interest to justify the classification, or must the state simply show

that the statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest?
Some sex classifications have demanded strict scrutiny; 191 subsequent cases have adopted an intermediate test: "Classifications by

188.
189.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 3).
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-12. The state offered "no legitimate overriding purpose

independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification." Id. at
11.
190. Baehr,852 P.2d at 63. But see Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fain. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1387 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), affd, No. 92-CV-737, 1995 WL 21117
(D.C. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1995) (trial judge quoting Biblical passages to sustain refusal of
same-sex marriage).
191. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The majority opinion

in Baehr relies upon this decision to apply strict scrutiny for sex based classifications.
See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66.

gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' 92 Thus, the
Hawaii Supreme Court had as possibilities the application of "some form

of 'heightened' scrutiny, be it 'strict' or 'intermediate,' rather than mere

'rational basis' analysis."' 93 The court adopted the former, the strictest
test of judicial scrutiny. The reasoning of the court centered on the
presence in the Hawaii Constitution of the Equal Rights Amendment."9 This amendment raises the level of scrutiny to strict when
examining sex-based classification under equal protection.
It therefore follows, ... that [the statute upon which the plaintiffs base their
claims] is presumed to be unconstitutional... unless... the State of Hawaii,
can show that (a) the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling
state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional rights.'95

The equal protection argument of Baehr also has due process

implications. First, it suggests that "the due process right to marry [for

gay and lesbian persons] continues to be an uphill battle."' 96 The
justices deciding the case ignore the reality of plaintiff's homosexuality:
"[I]t is immaterial whether the plaintiffs, or any of them, are homosexuals."' 97 They thus deny the inherent quality of personhood, the

lifestyle-including conduct-of the gay or lesbian person. Furthermore,
"[a]ll of the justices voting in Baehr rejected the plaintiffs' due process
challenge, although four of the five.., were open to some kind of equal
protection challenge."' 98 The Hawaii decision, therefore, even though

it is significant for its rejection of the definitional obstacle to same-sex
marriages, did not address the substantive due process rights of the
litigants to marry because they were gay or lesbian.

For purposes of gay and lesbian rights, a due process argument is
preferable to equal protection because it would signal the end of the

192. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
193. Id. at 65.
194. Id. at 67. The court relied heavily on the concurring opinion of Justice Powell,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, in Frontiero. They provided
substance to the theory that: "[H]ad the Equal Rights Amendment been incorporated
into the United States Constitution, at least seven members (and probably eight) of the
Frontiero Court would have subjected statutory sex-based classifications to 'strict'
judicial scrutiny." Id.
195. Id. It would be logical to think that the compelling state interest would result
from the significant public anger over the court's allowance of a consideration of
inclusion of same-sex partners within the definition of marriage.
196. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1509.
197. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 58 n.17. Or, "[p]arties to a same-sex marriage could
theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals." Id. at 51 n.11.
198. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1509.
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Bowers v. Hardwick era where conduct is equated with criminality and
immorality. Due process recognition would ratify personhood;19 9 it
would recognize "the fundamental importance of lesbian and gay
conduct."2 "0 But none of this is present in Baehr."°' In that Baehr

ignores the actuality of gay and lesbian conduct, it allows for Bowers v.
Hardwick, perpetuates the status/conduct distinction, and worst of all,
implies that two same-sex persons would seek to marry one another
because one or both were heterosexual-without any reference at all to
the possibility that both may be responsible homosexuals.
The subtle and pervasive attitude of Bowers v. Hardwick is the central
issue within the need for substantive due process attention. One
commentator explains: "The phobic figural representations by which the
Supreme Court produces a hierarchical differentiation or 'scaling' of
homosexual and heterosexual acts and agency in the Hardwick decision
provide an indispensable map of the ideological situation with which
contemporary gay and lesbian politics must now contend."2 2 Oddly
enough, it is like the scorn of the "apolitical, economically privileged
students toward members of religions identified as 'hicky.""
Both
groups, gay and lesbian persons and religious fundamentalists, share the
distinction of being minority and different. Even though there is mutual
distrust and even abhorrence, the two groups are quite similarly situated.
Each suffers because the conduct of either is considered abnormal by the
majority. Each suffers because each is the victim of "respectable

199. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 11; FRANK BROWNING, THE CULTURE
OF DESIRE: PARADOX AND PERVERSITY IN GAY LIvEs TODAY (1993); Raymond C.
O'Brien, The CultureofDesire by FrankBrowning,9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y

605 (1993) (book review).
200. Cain, supra note 55, at 1633.
201.

An example of the type of substantive due process recognition which would

have been advantageous in Baehr would be that found in High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1990), where District Judge Thelton Henderson wrote: "The Supreme Court
in Hardwick simply did not address the issue of all homosexual activity ... that two gay
people have no right to touch each other in a way that expresses their affection and love
for each other." Id. at 1370.
202. Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1831 (1979).
203. Lacey, supra note 32, at 16 (describing students in her classes at the University
of Tulsa who directed scorn at the 10% of religious fundamentalists on the campus).

prejudice." 2' Each group needs to address this prejudice if it is to
have a voice in decisionmaking. This is at the heart of the due process
struggle for gay and lesbian persons.
Despite its limitations, Baehr and the judicial system of Hawaii have

provided another step in the due process analysis directed towards gay
and lesbian persons. By remanding the case with directions to define the
compelling state interest for rejecting same-sex marriages, the Hawaiian
courts have taken another step towards gay and lesbian identity." 5
Whether intentional or not, the debate regarding same-sex marriage will
in fact focus on homosexuality even though this is not what the Hawaii
Supreme Court acknowledged. This debate will discuss identity and
differences, status and conduct, roles and realities. It will contribute to
the structure of a substantive due process argument acknowledged by
Justice Blackmun in his dissent to Bowers v. Hardwick. For him, the
case did not involve homosexual sodomy, it involved "the fundamental
interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate
associations with others.""2 6 Thus, Baehr is another step in describing
the associations that lead to identity.
So too, when the Hawaii Supreme Court analogizes the same-sex
couple in Baehr to the black female and Caucasian male in Loving, it
contributes to the substantive due process argument for gay and lesbian
persons." 7 The similarity provides the mechanism for accepting the
fact that just as societal changes brought about the inclusion of
interracial marriage within the definition of marriage, so too can societal
change bring about the inclusion of gay and lesbian intimate associations, conduct, and status within the definition of marriage. The point
of Baehr's reasoning is the premise of change; that amidst Stonewall, 0 ' Canmermeyer, Wasson, and Presidential support, there is an
attitudinal change. The change is not without objection. The legislature

204. Strongly held religious beliefs can often be victimized by prejudice that if
directed towards women or persons of color would not be tolerated. So too, "Peter J
Gomes, an American Baptist minister and professor of Christian morals at Harvard
University, has described homophobia as 'the last respectable prejudice of the century."'

BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE: THE GAY INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

81(1993).
205. See generally Ortiz, supra note 29.

206. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. For an analysis of the unique relationship of homosexual and African
Americans to the AIDS pandemic, see Raymond C. O'Brien, Discrimination: The
Difference With AIDS, 6 1 CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 93 (1990).
208. See MARTiN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993) for a recounting of the Stonewall
riots in 1969. See infra text accompanying note 213.
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of Hawaii was quick to ban same-sex marriages.20 9 It is predictable
that the citizens of Hawaii may initiate changes in their constitution to
deflect the Baehr ruling, thereby forcing the issue upon federal courts
not as willing to enter the domestic relations fray.10 If the federal
courts refuse to consider the question under an equal protection aegis,
each state would adjudicate same-sex marriage individually, with
The resulting
recognition by other states based on public policy 1
debate will certainly affect the substantive rights of gay and lesbian
persons. Such a debate will be essential, productive, and identifying.
IV. THE GAY

AND LESBIAN COMMUNITY

When the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund announced the
decision in Baehr v. Lewin, it was described as "one of our movement's
most significant legal victories to date."2' 12 By the winter of 1994,

Lambda had announced sixteen judicial, legislative, and political

victories in four months. 213 And 1994 was also the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Stonewall, where:
[a]t a little after one a.m. on the morning of June 28, 1969, the police carried
out a routine raid on [a gay bar in New York's Greenwich Village]. But it
turned out not to be routine at all. Instead of cowering-the usual reaction to
a police raid--the patrons inside Stonewall and the crowd that gathered outside
the bar fought back against the police. The five days of rioting that followed
changed forever the face of lesbian and gay life. In the years since 1969, the

209. See Hawaii Enacts Ban on Same-Sex Marriages,RECORD, June 24, 1994, at
A38; Hawaii Law Bans Same-Sex "Marriage",WASH. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at A9;
Susan Essoyan, HawaiiTries to Take a StandAgainst Same-Sex Marriages,L.A. TiMEs,
Apr. 26, 1994, at A5; Susan Yim, Hawaii Court Ruling Isn't End ofSame-Sex Marriage
Debate, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Dec. 7, 1993, at A25.
210. See generally CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 12-2, at 414-20.
211. The fact that one state might recognize same-sex marriages does not mean that
another state would be forced to accept that recognition under Full Faith and Credit.
Since recognition by one state would not constitute an adjudicated final judgment, the
United States Constitution would not require recognition. Instead, public policy of other
states would be the standard of recognition. See id. § 2.3, at 34-44.
212. Evan Wolfson, HawaiiSupreme Court Paves Way for Same-Sex Marriage, 10
LAMBDA UPDATE 1 (1993).
213. See Beatrice Dohrn, Victory!, 11 LAMBDA UPDATE 1 (1994) (victories included
domestic partnership coverage in New York City, an anti-gay initiative blocked in
Cincinnati, adoption and custody cases, the American with Disabilities Act which
prohibits AIDS insurance caps, and access to dental health care in New York City for
HIV infected persons).

Stonewall riots have become the central symbolic event of the modem gay
movement 2

The victories and celebration are reflected in the angry cry of a young
man at the start of the gay rights movement: "We don't want acceptance,
goddamn it! We want respect!"215
Respect is at the center of the substantive due process arguments; the
issues involve an end to the military ban on gays and lesbians, same-sex
marriage, and domestic partnership, to name a few. The object of the
respect is the recognition of a lifestyle that is just as quixotic and
developing as that within the heterosexual community. It is important
to note that domestic partnership is attractive to the heterosexual
community; there is a mutuality between the two on this issue,
something that must be regarded as one of the most significant changes
in America. Heterosexuals may well be shocked to experience this
similarity. After all, homosexuals have always been acutely aware of
heterosexuals, but the difference today is that heterosexuals are
increasingly aware of homosexuals. Frank Browning captures this

unique change in his book, The Culture of Desire:
Rich, raucous, passionate, sometimes self-absorbed, often petulant, the builders
of the new gay social terrain in this country have, at the very least, challenged
the way Americans think about desire in ordinary life. From the deepest
hollows of Appalachia to the flattest prairies of Nebraska, there is not a high
school football captain or cheerleader alive who does not know that there are
other human plots than the ones taught in Sunday school or sold on the
paperback racks at Rexall .... By and by, all of us, homo and hetero, male and
female, queer and conventional, are brought along onto journeys of rage and
irony and sadness and revelation that neither the queer insurgents nor their
pinched and prudish antagonists could have foreseen even a few years ago.216

But respect demands responsibility. Within the gay and lesbian
culture there are many voices. Among them is that of Frank Browning,
who, when speaking of the debate and the conflict within the lesbian and
gay community acknowledges: "In the culture of desire, there are no safe
spaces. '217 There is also Bruce Bawer, who writes: "Homosexuality
itself doesn't circumscribe, it contributes; it doesn't commit all gay
individuals to a single path in life, it merely exerts an influence on the
distinctive course traveled by each individual."2 18 Bawer criticizes a
particular faction which he calls the gay subculture,2 19 because he

214.

DUBERMAN, supra note 207, at inside cover.

215.
216.
217.

Id. at 211.
BROWNING, supra note 198, at 25; see O'Brien, supra note 198.
Browning, supra note 198, at 229.

218.

BAWER, supra note 203, at 38.

219.

Id. at 153-223.
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believes "[i]t disdains the notion of individual identity and takes a
reductive, narrowly deterministic view of homosexuality."22
He
argues instead, in a thought borrowed from Mary Renault's The
Charioteer:"[D]on't use your homosexuality or their contempt for it as
an excuse to lower your moral standards. The important thing is to
behave in such a way as to keep your own respect and that of people
whose respect means something." '
It seems this is part of his
conclusion that homosexuality "is neither good nor evil. It simply is.
And it will not go away."
He rejects the comment made by a
former 'professor of his: "[I]t's OK to be gay so long as you're ashamed
of it." 2
Bawer makes an intriguing point about why visibility of a gay and
lesbian culture is valuable as a contribution to gay identity and the
formation of a substantive due process argument. He suggests looking
at a rerun of an old Andy Grifflith show. "If you're white, try to imagine
what it's like being a black person watching the same show. Think of
it: a North Carolina town with no blacks whatsoever. None. Where are
they? ...Well, that's what it's like being a gay man and watching
virtually every TV drama and comedy." 4 As America comes to
recognize-through television and film and music, mostly-the presence
of a culture of gay and lesbian persons, it will not find that they are all
the same. Darrell Yates Rist traveled across America looking for "the
real gay America beyond the stereotypes of the popular media."'2 His
conclusion is that:
Most of the men I met held more in common with their neighbors than with all

the other homosexual men I had ever known. And although I found intimate
communities of homosexual men throughout the West, whose shared lives made
them brothers, I found no trait that surely united all homosexual men in a single
gay community.'

220. Id. at 38.
221.

Id. at 201.

222.

Id. at 49.

223.

224.
225.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 92.
See DARRELL Y.

RiST, HEARTLANDS: A GAY MAN'S ODYSSEY ACROSS
AMERICA at inside cover (1992); see also ROBERT C. REINHART, A HISTORY OF

SHADOWS (1986) (stories from gay men who lived during the Depression, the war years,
and the fifties).
226.

RiST, supra note 224, at 225.

Amidst this diversity is the emergence of the need for an identity,
something other than desire.
One of the distinct deductions of The Culture ofDesireis the absolute necessity
of gay and lesbian persons to arrive at a fulcrum upon which they can balance
their own perceived individual identity as persons imbued with distinctive
sexual conduct that is viewed by the media, and often by themselves, as
aberrant, and at the same time something that defines themselves as an
orientation, a formative group, a culture, a family.227
What can bring this about? What can contribute to the notion that gay
and lesbian persons are family? Surely through the history and the
litigation, the political agendas and the media inclusion of homosexual
identity, and the acceptance and living of life, gays and lesbians are
facilitating family:
Having spent years standing on sidewalks in movie lines watching straight

couples nuzzling and embracing, same-sex couples now refuse to deny
themselves demonstrative intimacy. Bombarded with straight adolescent
romance films in their own youth, they have begun to film their own romance
stories. With228breadth and irony, they are creating and communicating their own
queer plots.

If this is so, what comes next? "If friendship is to generate the
genuine power of family, what must it do? ' 229 The answer "will
surely have to confront these abiding American problems of individualism and commitment. Along the way, it will have to move the family
of friends beyond a celebration of private happiness to an affirmation of
civic participation."
There is little doubt that this is done in both
the homosexual and heterosexual community. The essential difference
is that it is much more obvious now, particularly in perspective of the
AIDS pandemic, within the gay and lesbian community. But there is
another aspect of civic participation that would be an avenue to greater
commitment, another ingredient in a definitional family. This is
domestic partnership.
The gay and lesbian community has in domestic partnership a unique
vehicle for the formation of family, for civic participation, and for
increased protection under substantive due process. The argument could
be made that domestic partnership flows from the community commit227. O'Brien, supra note 198, at 618.
228. BROWNING, supra note 198, at 19.
229. Id. at 157.

230.

Id. at 159. For similar themes directed towards mainstream American culture,

see, for example, R. M. DwoRKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,

EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); PAUL D. KNOTT, REMAKING AMERICA:
THE VALUES REVOLUTION (1994); MICHAEL GURIAN, THE PRINCE AND THE KING

(1992).
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ment over AIDS; the commitment continues between two persons.
Likewise, to date, the domestic partnership arrangements have centered
on the availability of benefits. The next stage is to incorporate shared
responsibilities in the manner of support and obligation. It would be to
the advantage of the gay and lesbian community to bring this about.
True, for many persons, this responsibility is implied; but responsibility
should now become a material provision for entitlement to benefits.
Responsibility, quite simply, is the next stage.
V. THE NEXT STAGE: RESPONSIBILITY
At present, domestic partnerships provide benefits to the partners
under the political or business programs discussed earlier. 31 These
benefits can include (1) access to company events and facilities, (2)
bereavement/sickness leave, (3) employee assistance program/counseling,
232
(4) relocation assistance, (5) health coverage, and (6) dental plan.
But what would happen if one of the partners became ill; would the
other have the responsibility for payment of medical expenses above
those provided by the employer? Would there be a responsibility for
legal assistance, for food, for housing, for what has come to be known
as necessities?233 Under the common law, one spouse was required to
provide support suitable to the other's rank and station in life, or
commensurate with their circumstances or standard of living 34 Does
a domestic partner have this duty of support?
The issue arose in Seattle, Washington with this inquiry: "The City
Council that passed the [domestic partnership ordinance] last September

231.
232.

See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
MACKENs, supra note 62, at 187 (describing those benefits at Lotus Develop-

ment Corp.).

233. Between a husband and wife there is a duty of support during marriage
according to their respective means and ability to perform the duty. Many states have
statutes making nonsupport between spouses a crime. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 230.5 (1980) ("A person commits a misdemeanor if he persistently fails to provide
support which he can provide and which he knows he is legally obliged to provide to

a spouse, child or other dependent."). Civil contempt enforcement is available as well.
See generally Sybil M. Jones, The Problem of Family Support: CriminalSanctionsfor
the Enforcement of Support, 38 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1959).
234.

See CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 6.1, at 252-58.

has not explained whether local merchants can now sue one domestic
partner if the other [partner] omits to pay his bills."235
The answer is somewhat vague. As was stated in Marvin v.
Marvin,236 a partnership can be the basis of a duty of support either
expressly or by implication. Thus, a responsibility of support exists
outside of marriage, based on a partnership theory, and it would seem
that this should apply to a domestic partnership as well.237 The
advances made in the theory of partnership between two adults as the
vehicle of support during and after marriage, between prenuptial and
postnuptial agreements, provides substance to a new understanding of
support responsibility. But with this responsibility comes the necessity

of providing the court with a basis for its order. Thus, there are two
rationales upon which greater responsibility could be established between
the two partners: implied partnership and express partnership. The
former rests upon equity and the latter upon either an agreement between
the two parties or the adoption of a statute applicable to domestic
partnerships. Again, the point is to take domestic partnership from
benefits to responsibility.
A.

Implied Theory of Responsibility

The essential element in Marvin was that the contract between two
adults, must be supported "by some recognized underlying obligation 239
in
law or equity."3 8 Without this obligation, no benefits accrue.
Because responsibility through implication will come about on a case-by-

235. Daniel Seligman, Seeking Fame in Congress, Where Liberals Are Rich,
CohabitingForFun and Profit,and Other Matters, FORTUNE, Dec. 4, 1989, at 188.
236. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); see supra text

accompanying notes 14-19 and 106. See generally Jeff C.Marderosian, Comment, The

Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants-A Proposal, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 485

(1979); Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation:

Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708 (1977); Christina M. Fernandez, Note,
Beyond Marvin: A Proposalfor Quasi-SpousalSupport, 30 STAN. L. REV. 359 (1978);
Linda R. Larson, Comment, Domestic Relations- Disposition of Property Upon
Termination of Nonmarital Cohabitation-Marvinv. Marvin, 53 WASH. L. REV. 145
(1977); GRAHAM DOUrHVAITE, UNMARRiED COUPLES AND THE LAW (1979).

237. But see Davis v. Misiano, 366 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. 1977) (refusing to provide
for a duty of support between non-marital persons).
238. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556 (1981);

see also In re Black, 160 Cal. App. 3d 582, 206 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984) (claim by
unmarried cohabitant to 50% of all property held by the decedent at the time of his
death).

239. See, e.g., Murphy v. Bowen, 756 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding

that even though both parties had lived together for 11 years without statutory or
common law marriage, there was no evidence of either an express or implied agreement
of joint venture or partnership, so no obligations of support arose).
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case basis, will be less precise than express responsibility, and will vary
among the different jurisdictions, the New Jersey approach offers insight.
New Jersey has been a leader in imposing equitable obligations. For
instance, in M.H.B v. H.TB.,24 ° the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was applicable to preclude a
former husband, Henry, from denying a duty to provide child support on
behalf of a child fathered by another, not himself. 41 The facts are
very important. A man and a woman were validly married and during
the first five years of their marriage they conceived two children.
Shortly after the five years the wife had a brief extra-marital affair and,
while still married to her husband, gave birth to a daughter which the
husband learned was not his own. With this knowledge, the husband
moved out of the house, but for the next three years did not divorce his
wife and did in fact support all three children with money, phone calls,
letters, gifts, and visits.242 There followed a six-month period of
reconciliation during which time the couple lived together with the
children, but the reconciliation failed and the mother was awarded
custody while the father agreed to pay family support.
When a final decree of divorce was obtained, both parties "stipulated
243 No alimony was
awarded, but the husband continued to pay child support, and "[a]ll three
minor children remained objects of Henry's affection, attention, and

that all three children were born of the marriage.

solicitude throughout the post-divorce period. In particular, Henry
expressed interest in and concern for [his putative daughter].... [She]
knows no other father, [even though her natural father lives nearby,] and
is ignorant of the facts surrounding her paternity.' 44 Based on all of
the evidence, the trial judge concluded that Henry had become the
child's "psychological, if not biological parent."2 45

240. 498 A.2d 775 (N.J. 1985); see also J.W.P. v. W.W. & J.H.P., 604 A.2d 695
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990) (sustaining equitable estoppel, but refusing to use
doctrine to release natural father from obligation of support).
241. M.H.B., 498 A.2d at 781. Note that this case is not about the statutory duty
of a stepparent for the support of a stepchild while the stepparent is married to the
natural parent. For this, see Washington Statewide Org. of Stepparents v. Smith, 536
P.2d 1202 (Wash. 1975).
242. M.H.B., 498 A.2d at 776.
243. Id.

244. Id.
245. Id. at 777.

Shortly thereafter, Henry remarried and then began to withhold support
payments. Specifically, by a pre-trial motion, Henry claimed that he
should be under no duty to support his putative daughter, as a blood test
confirmed that he was not the father of the child.246 The trial judge
concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was applicable to
preclude Henry from denying the duty to provide child support.247
The framework for the analysis was provided by a previous New Jersey
decision, Miller v. Miller.4 '

The M.H.B. court acknowledged the

Miller court's rationale that, "[b]ecause we were dealing with responsibilities that may flow from familial relationships that are inherently
complicated and subtle, we acknowledged that the application of
equitable
principles called for great sensitivity, caution, and flexibili249
ty.,

One of the elements of equitable estoppel applied by the New Jersey
court was "irreparable harm.""25 Again, quoting Miller, the court
found that "there is an innate immorality in the conduct of an adult who
for over a decade accepts and proclaims a child as his own, but then, in
order to be relieved of the child's support, announces, and relies upon
his bastardy."251 Such could be said of the domestic partnership
between two adults, with or without political registration, where one
provides financial support and then leaves, or refuses to pay for at least
the necessities of life. Thus, in the case of Braschi v. Stahl Assocs.,
Co.,252 where the two men had been together and shared significant

incidents of life for over ten years before one of them died, would there
be irreparable harm to deny support to one upon which he relied, and the
other freely gave for so long a period of time? And if Sharon
Kowalski's parents had sued the now comatose daughter's life partner

246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).

This case involved two girls whose mother

remarried after divorcing their father. During the mother's second marriage, the
defendant, her second husband, assumed sole responsibility for the girl's financial
support, as well as other parental privileges and obligations. He discouraged his wife

and stepchildren from having contact with the former husband and natural father, but
nonetheless, after the divorce that ended seven years of marriage he refused to continue
child support for the stepchildren. The court held that he was equitably estopped to deny
his duty to continue to support the stepchildren. Id. at 353.
249. M.H.B., 498 A.2d at 777 (paraphrasing from Miller). For an example of a
court stating that it needed a sufficiently definite and predictable test to allow for
consistent application from case to case, see Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d
582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).

250. M.H.B., 498 A.2d at 779.
251. Id. at 780.
252. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing non-marital partners to become
family for purposes of rent control law in New York City).
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for four years, seeking to obtain support for long-term care for their
daughter from the person who had shared significant incidents of
life-court referred to them as a family of affinity-would there have
been irreparable harm to deny them relief?2 3 These are cases in which
the partners have not signed an agreement, nor registered with a business
or city.
Establishing an implied theory of responsibility between a parent and
a putative child may seem justified from the perspective of the
vulnerability of the child; the irreparable harm to the child and the
concomitant inability of the child to foresee the harm, justify a remedy.
But the New Jersey Supreme Court is content to address both the adult's
and the minor's expectations because of the establishment of an
"intimate familial relationship."2 ' Increasingly, the court is drawn to
the fact that when a bond is established in which expectations are
raised--such as in most domestic partnerships-an implied theory of
responsibility attaches. Specific cases are likely to follow.
In June, 1994, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Dunphy v. Gregor,
issued an opinion which further erodes the distinction between married
and unmarried cohabitants, and adopted instead, a standard based on the
significance and stability of the plaintiff's relationship.2 55 Dunphy was
engaged to marry Burwell and had been living with him for two years
when she witnessed him being struck by a car while changing a flat tire.
Burwell's body was tossed or dragged 240 feet as a result of the
collision and all Dunphy could do when she reached him was to clear
pebbles and blood from his mouth, attempt to subdue his hands and feet
as he thrashed about, and comfort him. Burwell died some hours later
in the hospital. As a result of her experience, Dunphy was undergoing

psychiatric treatment. She sought to recover from the driver of the car
damages for the "mental anguish, pain and suffering" experienced as a
result of witnessing the events that led to the death of her fiance.256
New Jersey had heretofore applied the test adopted in California257

253. See In re Guardianship of Kowalsli, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(awarding guardianship over disabled partner to her life partner of four years).
254. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 375 (N.J. 1994).
255. Id. at 374.
256. Id. at 373.
257. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). But
see Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988) (refusing
to extend recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to nonmarital

requiring a marital or intimate, familial relationship between plaintiff and

the injured person before recovery could be had for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, but was divided as to whether marriage was a
condition of recovery. In a departure from other states, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found marriage was not a prerequisite. Instead, the court
allowed recovery based on the significance and stability of the plaintiff's
relationship with the injured party. The jury may determine the
significance and stability based on:
the duration of the relationship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of

common contributions to a life together, the extent and quality of shared
experience ...."whether the plaintiff and the injured person were members of
the same household, their emotional reliance on each other, the particulars of
their day to day relationship, and the manner in which they related to each other
in attending to life's mundane requirements.""

The significance of this decision is that it allows for recovery outside
of the status of marriage based on an implied theory of responsibility.
While recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is a benefit
to the plaintiff, such a theory has equal applicability of responsibility to
the plaintiff. It is logical to suggest that a relationship that is significant
and stable may imply not only benefits, but also responsibilities.
B. Express Theory of Responsibility
Express responsibility could take the form of an agreement between
the two parties, a statute mandating responsibility or characterizing the
status of the relationship, or a combination of the two. Based on the
ascendancy of the partnership approach to marriage and the inherent
nature of domestic partnership itself, it would seem that agreements
between two adult contracting parties will be the likely source of
litigation in the future. What did the parties contract? The agreement

should therefore be the subject of increased scrutiny by both heterosexual and homosexual communities. Later, as domestic partnerships achieve
greater use and are accorded greater status, statutory efforts may follow
as a means by which uniformity and fairness can be achieved.
1. Private Agreements
As with prenuptial agreements and non-marital contracts, the
disclosure, equity, and capacity of the two parties to an express

cohabitants).
258. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 375 (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 617 A.2d 1249, 1255
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)).
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agreement would be essential. The two parties, regardless of sexual

orientation, would have the ability, under a theory of partnership, to

establish the terms of their arrangement in the same manner as parties
to any other non-marital contract. Nonetheless, because of the presence
of domestic partnership, either business or government benefits would

be included. Excluded would be exclusive control over children or
public policy restraints that do not suffer because of privacy, equal
protection, or due process arguments. The parties can bbnefit from the
forms, literature, and comments made about non-marital contracts to
date.2 9 In some instances, the non-marital couple, even though
seeking a domestic partnership, may wish to limit the benefits and
obligations of the relationship. In such instances, forms such as an antipalimony agreement could be utilized to eliminate implied obligations.2 6
An anti-palimony agreement, executed between two cohabiting nonmarital partners, requires full disclosure and a writing. Its purpose is to:
define the financial arrangements, rights, and responsibilities between the parties
while they are living together unmarried and at such time as they may cease to
live together, and to provide that their living together unmarried will not create
any financial
261rights in either party against the income or the property of the
other party.

The elements of the agreement include the following:
(1)
Advice of Counsel: It is necessary to have independent counsel
who consults with each party and who assists with full disclosure,
fairness, and full and mature consideration.
(2)
No Common Law Marriage: The intention not to enter into any
form of marriage is made clear.

259.

See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior:

Sanctions on Non-maritalCohabitation, 1981 WIS. L. Rv. 275; Henna H.Kay & Carol
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preservingthe Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977); William
A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of UnmarriedCohabitants:A Proposalfor
Creatinga New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677 (1984); Judith T. Younger, Marital
Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together With Criticism and
Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. RnV. 45 (1981); Joel E. Smith, Annotation,
Property Rights Arising from Relationship of Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 3
A.L.R.4th 13 (1981).
260. See, e.g., DAVID WESTFALL, DOCUMENTs AND STATUTES IN FAMILY LAW 156
(2d ed. 1994).
261. Id.

(3)
Complete Waiver of Financial Rights: "This waiver and release
shall apply while the parties live together, after they cease to live
together for any reason (if such event ever occurs) while both are living,
and after the death of either or both parties. 262
(4)
Limitations of Waiver Rights: The agreement is void if the parties

marry in a statutory manner, and if, "while both parties are living, they
cease to live together, the net fair market value of any joint property
shall be divided equally between them." 263
(5)
Household and Other Expenses: There exists a mutuality of
support, but "no legally enforceable obligation to support the other party
shall have been created." 264
(6)
Voluntary Transfers: Inter vivos and testamentary transfers will
not be affected by the agreement, each party retaining the right to
transfer or receive transfers from others.
(7)
Debts: "[E]ach party shall be responsible for his or her own debts
incurred before and after the date of this Agreement, and each party
specifically agrees to indemnify and to hold the other party harmless
2 65
from any liability, loss, damage, or expense arising therefrom."
(8)
Separate Property: This section characterizes property of each
party.
(9)
Disclaimer: Each of the parties desires and intends that this
Agreement supersede any statutory or other legal or equitable rights he
or she might have or otherwise acquire in the other's property or to
obtain support or maintenance from the other as a result of their living
together unmarried or in a common-law marriage.2
(10) Effect of Nondisclosure: Property discovered after this agreement
belonging to the other party does not waive the agreement.
(11)
Governing Law: Parties may choose the applicable law.
(12) Modification of the Agreement: "This Agreement may be modified,
altered, or revoked only by a writing executed by the parties with the

same formality as this Agreement."2 ' 7
(13) Arbitration: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this Agreement or the termination or breach thereof shall be resolved by
arbitration. A board of three arbitrators shall be used, each party
choosing one arbitrator and the two arbitrators choosing a third. The

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

158.
159.
160.
161.
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decision of the majority of the board shall be controlling. A majority of
the board may specify the arbitration procedures.""26
(14) Miscellaneous: This section provides for expenses of litigation,
partial invalidity or revocation, and states that the Agreement contains
the entire understanding of the parties.
There is similarity between this anti-palimony agreement and the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.2 69 The differences being in the
popular acceptance of premarital agreements and the fact that they
become effective upon marriage, whereas anti-palimony agreements are
not popular and cease to be effective upon marriage. They both
emphasize the ability of the couple to enter into a private binding

contractual partnership. The implications of this should not be omitted
in developing greater responsibility within domestic partnerships.
2.

Statutory Agreements

Of this we can be certain, as domestic partnerships become more
prevalent among American couples, cities, states, and the federal
Litigation will incite
government will seek greater involvement.27
some legislation. Further legislation will come about through development of the issue and through the lobbying efforts of groups with
cohabiting partners, both heterosexual and homosexual. It is likely that
statutory efforts would include some of the following:
Mutual obligations. States may wish to exceed the implied limits of
responsibility enumerated in cases described earlier,271 and require as
268. Id.
269.

Id. at 164-72.

270. For instance, Internal Revenue Code provisions affecting alimony and separate
maintenance, transfers of property between spouses or incident to divorce, and certain
property settlements, could be equally applicable to domestic partnership status
established by the states. See I.R.C. §§ 71, 1041, 2516 (1992). Likewise, surviving
spouse designations for joint and survivor annuity pre-retirement survivor annuities
could be amended to include domestic partners. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1056(d) (1988).
271. See supra notes 237-38. For a statutory example of support in reference to
marital couples, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (West 1994).
In ordering ... support ... the court shall consider all of the following

circumstances:

(a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to
maintain the standard of living established during the [partnership], taking into
account all of the following:

a matter of public policy that partners be "subject to the general rules

governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons
'
occupying confidential relations with each other."272
General rules for
liability would protect the rights of creditors of domestic partnerships.2 73 Of course, since partnership agreements between adults
cannot deprive the state of its role in the protection of minors, any

children born to cohabiting non-marital couples would be protected
under existing statutory provisions.

In one area of the law, estates and trusts, the reality of domestic
partnerships and the changes in American society it represents, has

become a factor in recent statutory changes. In adopting the 1990
Uniform Probate Code, the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate

Code adopted an approach which accepted the decline of formalism in
the American definition of family, and this recognition affects the
transfer of property at death.274

The issue is whether states, the

(1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those
skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the
appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible
need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or
employment.
(2) The extent to which the supported party's present or future earning
capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the
[partnership] to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.

Id.

(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of
an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party.
(c) The ability to pay of the supporting party, taking into account the
supporting party's earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and
standard of living.
(d)The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during
the [partnership].
(e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party.
(f) The duration of the [partnership].
(g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without
unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the
party.
(h) The age and health of the parties.
(i)
The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
(j) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable.

272. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West 1994).
273. See, e.g., id. § 910 (referring to liability for debts in the marital context); see
also id. §§ 2620-28.
274. See U.P.C., art. 2, Prefatory Note (1990); see also James Lindgren, The Fall
of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009 (1992); Margaret V. Turano, UPC Section 2-201:

Equal Treatment of Spouses?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 983 (1992); Gregory S. Alexander,
Ademption and the Domain of Formality in Wills Law, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1067 (1992);

Mary P. Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family", 26 GONZ. L.
REv.91 (1991); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal
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traditional purveyor of wealth at death through statutes guarantying
intestate2 7s or testate distribution, will make the connection between
the joint efforts of married couples and the joint efforts of non-marital
cohabitants.27 6 If the essential ingredient is the partnership between the
two, and because of that partnership economic benefits were acquired,
the status of marriage should not be the deciding factor in the distribution of that wealth upon the death of either party.
The Uniform Probate Code, because of its purpose "to make uniform
' is a good vehicle from
the law among the various jurisdictions,"277
which to discuss provisions in the law of intestate and testate succession
that could change in providing for domestic partners. The Uniform
Probate Code was certainly not intended as a source for the possible
inclusion of domestic partners, but one should consider the following:

Share of the Spouse. The most recent revision of the Code increased
the share of the surviving spouse, thus recognizing a trend evidenced in
empirical studies.27 The availability of domestic partnerships could
support the inclusion of the partner as an intestate heir with the same
portion as that which would have gone to the spouse. Particular
remedies to restrict inequities, such as elective share, augmented
estate,"' entitlement under a premarital will,2 81 homestead allowance, 282 exempt property,283 and family allowance,2&4 may all in-

Rights Under the Revised Uniform ProbateCode, 76 IowA L. REv. 223 (1991); Jane
Drummey, Note, Family Ties: A Comparisonofthe ChangingLegal Definition ofFamily
in Succession Rights to Rent-Regulated Housingin the United States and GreatBritain,
17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 123 (1991); Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family?
Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24
IDAHO L. REv. 353 (1988).
275. The intestate estate is defined as "[a]ny part of a decedent's estate not
effectively disposed of by will." U.P.C. § 2-101(a) (1990).
276. Other state statutes and uniform acts would be subject to the same inquiry.
See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN & LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, SELECTED STATUTES ON
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 585, 652 (1994) (relating to the Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act and Uniform Marital Property Act).
277. U.P.C. § 1-102(b)(5) (1990).
278. Id. § 2-102, cmt.
279. Id. §§ 2-201, 2-203, 2-207.
280. Id. § 2-202.
281. Id. § 2-301.
282. Id. § 2-402.
283. Id. § 2-403.
284. Id. § 2-404.
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elude domestic partners in addition to marital spouses. And again, some
would apply to both intestate and testate distribution.
Additional inclusion could be made as to the effect of divorce,
annulment or separation, 85 the meaning of relative,286 the priorities
of who may be a guardian2 or a conservator,2 88 or any other special
status enjoyed by a spouse. It is not that marriage is unimportant, it is
simply that, since domestic partnership presumes the absence of a spouse
but nonetheless the presence of wealth that accumulates in a partnership
fashion, the person who contributed to that function should participate
in the economic distribution without contest from a formal family.
These statutory changes are not likely to come about in the near
future. Private agreements between domestic partners will need to
develop and bring about a change in attitude, acceptance, and reliance
before legislative recognition will follow. Nonetheless, the debate has
started and since the change in marriage from status to partnership has
begun already, it is likely that, with the implementation of more
domestic partnerships, statutory rights to the transfer of wealth at death

will occur.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Hawaii recognized-and caused great public
scrutiny of-a significant change in the way family is defined when it
held, in Baehr v. Lewin, that it was now necessary for the state to
provide compelling reasons to deny persons of the same-sex the right to
marry. Changes had been taking place as a result of Griswold'sprivacy,
Eisenstadt's individuality, Marvin's non-marital contracts, and the host
of other judicial, social, and moral changes in America. The Hawaiian
decision, no matter what the outcome, has had far less impact than the
changes brought about through judicial and legislative recognition of
partnership as the functional basis of adult relationships. Because
partnership has demanded expressional forms in addition to marriage,
non-marital contracts and domestic partnerships developed. While
neither of these approaches the history, significance, or status of
marriage, each is unique and now firmly established as a business
incentive and a political boon. Like them or not, domestic partnerships

285. Id. §§ 2-802, 2-804.
286. See id. § 2-603.
287. See id. § 5-305(c)(1) ("[T]he spouse of the incapacitated person or a person
nominated by will of a deceased spouse or by other writing signed by the spouse and

attested by at least 2 witnesses [is entitled to consideration for appointment].").
288. See id. § 5-409(a)(3) ("T he spouse of the protected person [is entitled to
consideration for appointment].").
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offer an alternative to marriage for both the heterosexual and homosexual couple seeking a bit more permanence, and perhaps a bit more benefit.
For the gay or lesbian person, domestic partnership is an opportunity
for public recognition. This implies the struggle of equal protection and
the years since Stonewall in 1969, the lifting of the military ban and the
abolition of sodomy statutes in southern courts, plus the recognition that
two men could share all the necessities of life in a rent-controlled
apartment in New York City and be more than strangers. It implies that
a lower court in Hawaii must now provide compelling reasons why two
adults who are of the same sexual orientation should be prevented from
marrying in a state sanctioned ceremony.
Most of all, domestic partnership implies for the gay and lesbian
community an argument for due process of law. This is the theory that
homosexuality is not a choice, it is an orientation and entitled to the
same life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness as those persons within a
heterosexual orientation. It is an element of personhood to want and
achieve partnership; it is a recognition of family.
To date, domestic partnership has provided benefits. The benefits are
increasing at both the business and political levels. Nonetheless, the
next stage for domestic partners must be the inclusion of responsibility.

For gay and lesbian persons responsibility would assist in bringing about
the substantive due process arguments so sought by litigators. That is,
by accepting the obligations of life, the status of family and commitment
and production would lend credence to sexual orientation claims of both
equality and substance.
The detractors-and they would include persons who rationally believe
that the traditional family is the family of form-need to be brought into
dialogue and made aware of the advantages of domestic partnership.'
America is a nation based on a Judeo-Christian sense of morality, and
this religious heritage is not something to be abandoned by domestic
partners, nor by those who see in domestic partnership another step in
an expanding agenda of social change. Instead, the heirs of this
religious heritage must confront the issue of immutability of sexual
orientation. Also to be confronted is the fact that domestic partnership,
benefits and responsibilities, does not have as its primary object sexual

activity. To dwell upon this fallacy is to fall victim to the heritage
of
289
Bowers v. Hardwick, rather than the "great mystery" of family.
The advantage to society from the incorporation of domestic
partnership is far more evident if responsibility results. But nonetheless,
the issue that all must confront is whether the state can recognize a
different form of family already in existence. Can the state-without
tradition and without the religious underpinnings that form that
tradition-establish a new objective standard of what constitutes family?
The answer to this will appear in the way in which we utilize judicial
decisions recognizing implied responsibility towards children and
between persons not married but sufficiently considered to be family to
allow recovery under traditional tort theories. Children make a
difference, too, and domestic partnership must account for them as well.
Finally, the future of domestic partnership will develop through private
consensual agreements. The future alone can determine what will
happen with legislative enactments. Nonetheless, both heterosexual and
homosexual persons and groups should analyze the possibilities of
statutory inclusion of domestic partnerships. These must particularly
include changes in the tax code to allow greater equality between marital
partners and domestic partners. But changes are warranted in the

manners in which we transfer wealth upon death.

If marriage is

increasingly a partnership in scope, it is not only equitable but predictable that the domestic partner should be provided with the same testate
and intestate benefits as the marital partner. But when all is said and
done, no matter what society implies or exacts, domestic partnership is
still--simply-an index of belonging.

289.
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Ephesians 5:32 (New American Bible).

